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DOES THE STOCK MARKET FULLY VALUE INTANGIBLES? – BRANDS AND 
GLOBAL EQUITY PRICES 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between brands and stock returns. 
I study the historical stock performance of global brand stocks, and test whether strong 
brands outperform the market index. A company is considered a brand stock if it is 
included in the annually published Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list. I also 
investigate whether numeric brand values assigned by Interbrand have an effect on the 
brand portfolio return. 
 
DATA 
 
The data set consists of all the publicly listed brand owner firms included in the 
Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list during 2001-2009. The monthly returns 
are calculated for a market value-, equal- and brand value-weighted global brand 
portfolio and analyzed statistically with the CAPM and Fama-French three factor model. 
The sample is then split into North America, Europe and Asia portfolios to uncover 
geographical performance differences.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The results suggest that brand stocks behave differently in North America than in Europe 
and Asia. The North America brand portfolio generates a significantly positive risk-
adjusted alpha, which holds for different portfolio weighting methods and controlling for 
outliers. This result is in line with prior research results. However, results for the Europe 
and Asia portfolios lack significance and no evidence for outperformance is found. In 
addition, I find that brand value-weighting does not enhance excess returns, but on the 
contrary, diminishes the alpha. Findings suggest that numeric brand values may not be 
accurate after all, and that the stock market seems to assimilate brands better in Europe 
and Asia than in North America. Thus, future research should address the reasons causing 
excess returns of American brands.    
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AINEETTOMIEN HYÖDYKKEIDEN ARVOSTUS OSAKEMARKKINOILLA – 
BRÄNDIT JA GLOBAALIT OSAKKEET 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
 
Tutkielman tarkoituksena on tutkia brändin vaikutusta osakkeen kehitykseen. Tutkielma 
pyrkii selvittämään, ovatko niin sanotut brändiosakkeet tuottaneet historiallisesti 
markkinaindeksiä paremmin. Brändiosakkeet ovat yrityksiä, joiden omistama brändi on 
yltänyt vuosittain ilmestyvälle Interbrandin Global Top 100 Brands –rankinglistalle. 
Tutkielmassa testataan myös Interbrandin määrittämien numeeristen brändiarvojen 
vaikutusta brändiportfolion tuottoon.     
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
 
Aineisto käsittää kaikki pörssilistatut yritykset, joiden omistama brändi esiintyy 
Interbrandin Global Top 100 Brands –rankinglistalla vuosien 2001-2009 aikana. 
Brändiportfolion kuukausittaisia tuottoja, painotettuna markkina-arvoilla, 
samansuuruisilla painoilla sekä brändiarvoilla, testataan tilastollisesti CAPM ja Fama-
French three factor regressiomalleilla. Lisäksi aineisto jaetaan erikseen Pohjois-
Amerikka-, Eurooppa- ja Aasia-portfolioihin, jotta nähdään mikäli brändiosakkeet 
tuottavat eri tavalla eri mantereilla.   
 
TULOKSET 
 
Tuloksista käy ilmi, että pohjoisamerikkalaiset brändit ovat tuottaneet historiallisesti 
paremmin kuin osakemarkkinat keskimäärin. Tulos vahvistaa oletetun hypoteesin ja 
aikaisempien tutkimusten tuloksen. Eurooppa- ja Aasia-portfolioiden tulokset ovat 
tilastollisesti epämerkittäviä, ja eivät siten tue hypoteesia. Lisäksi tulokset kertovat, että 
brändiarvojen käyttäminen painoina portfoliossa heikentää ylituottoja. Tämä tulos 
vähentää numeeristen brändiarvojen uskottavuutta. Tutkielman johtopäätös on, että 
brändiosakkeet tuottavat eri tavalla Euroopassa ja Aasiassa kuin Pohjois-Amerikassa. 
Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että Pohjois-Amerikan rahoitusmarkkinat ylenkatsovat 
brändeihin liittyvää tuottopotentiaalia enemmän kuin Euroopan ja Aasian 
rahoitusmarkkinat. Tulevaisuudessa olisi tärkeä tutkia, miksi pohjoisamerikkalaiset 
brändiosakkeet tuottavat keskimääräistä paremmin.    
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation for the study 
 
Intangible assets and brands in particular have become increasingly important in the corporate 
world during the past decade. It has been argued that intangible assets of a firm may account 
for up to 75% of a firm’s market value (Haigh et al., 2004). The power of brands was first 
recognized by Aaker (1991) who stated that intangible brand properties such as customer 
brand-name awareness, brand loyalty, perceived brand quality and favorable brand symbolism 
and associations form the concept of brand equity, which creates competitive advantage and 
hence provides future earnings streams. Today the importance of branding as a marketing 
action is widely accepted in both academia and the corporate world. Brands are built, 
maintained and used to create a definite competitive advantage in the marketplace. Earlier, 
brands were considered to be especially vital for consumer goods, but lately also corporate 
brands have acquired more attention. Thus, brands are seen as an advantage also in a 
business-to-business environment where a well-known company is seen as a trusted partner.   
Researchers have defined the concept of brand in several different ways. However, they all 
conclude that a brand is the identity of a firm and its products, that has a positive effect on the 
competitiveness of the firm or its products. Kotler et al. (2004) define a brand as a “name, 
term, sign, symbol or design or combinations of them which is intended to identify the goods 
or services of one seller to differentiate them from those of competitors”. Above all, brand is a 
concept of marketing and due to its intangible nature, it is challenging to measure, quantify 
and understand the financial consequences of branding actions of a firm. Several researchers 
have argued that successful branding leads to tangible outcomes since firms with strong brand 
equity can easily expand demand for their products and services through internationalization 
and brand extensions (see e.g. Aaker, 1991 and Srivastava et al., 1998). Furthermore, brands 
as recognized trademarks provide legal protection for the firm owning the brand against 
counterfeit products. Additionally, a brand creates sustainable value for a firm by providing 
the firm the chance to establish premium prices for its goods and gives flexibility to alter 
these prices without losing customers (Haigh et al., 2004).   
The main reason why the value of brands and their significance is often disregarded in finance 
is due to the fact that International Accounting Standards forbid firms to recognize internally 
created brands on their balance sheets (IAS 38, 36). To the contrary, brands obtained through 
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an acquisition are recognized as assets on the balance sheet at the purchase date’s fair value 
according to the purchase method of IFRS. The purchase price exceeding the book value of 
assets is considered as goodwill. This drawback has led to financial statements’ inability to 
accurately reflect the financial positions of firms since not all intangible assets are included in 
the balance sheet. This is further proved by the widening gap of book values stated in 
financial statements and market values determined by the stock market (e.g. Lev et al., 1999).   
During the past few decades brand consulting firms such as Interbrand, Brand Finance and 
Millward Brown have emerged to answer to the challenge of accurate brand valuation. These 
consultancies have become known particularly for publishing brand ranking lists annually. 
These ranking lists are based on the quantitative brand value that the consultancies assign to 
each brand. One of the most renowned brand consultancies is Interbrand, which was founded 
in 1974. Interbrand has been valuating and ranking American brands since 1984 and global 
brands starting from 1999 and is considered as the market leader of brand valuation due to its 
long experience. In 2010, the best ranked global brand, Coca-Cola, had a brand value of $70 
billion representing 47% of the firm’s $149 billion market value (22.2.2011).  
The accuracy of the financial brand values estimated by brand consultancies has been 
discussed in the corporate world often. This has lead researchers to study the value relevance 
of these brand rankings. Barth et al. (1998a) discovered that brand valuations published by an 
independent agency are relevant and reflected in share prices. In addition, they found that 
brand value is positively associated with advertising expenses, operating margins and market 
share. Moreover, Kerin et al. (1998) find a significant positive relationship between brand 
values and market-to-book ratios of American consumer goods companies included in the 
Financial World magazine’s “The World’s Most Valuable Brands” ranking list during 1995 
and 1996. 
Furthermore, several studies have explored the relationship between intangible assets and 
stock market performance. Research and development as well as advertising expenditures 
have been proved to be behind abnormal stock returns (e.g. Lev et al., 1996 and Chan et al., 
2001). Excess returns are caused also by patents (Deng et al., 1999) and software 
developments (Aboody et al., 1998).  Edmans (2011) concludes that firms with high level of 
employee satisfaction generate superior long-term returns after controlling for industries, risk 
and a set of observable firm characteristics. Finally, Madden et al. (2006) find that strong 
American brands deliver greater long-term stock returns with less risk compared to a relevant 
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benchmark. Hence, it seems that the market fails to incorporate intangible assets fully into 
stock valuations even though the existence of intangible assets is well known.       
However, the financial benefits of building brand equity are yet partly unknown and need to 
be studied further. Little is known about how the stock market values the capability of 
market-based assets such as brands to improve current and future market performance 
(Srivastava et al., 1998). The only study concerning the stock performance of brand owners 
(“brand stocks”) is the study by Madden et al. (2006), which covers only American brands 
during the time period 1994-2001. Hence, the research of stock market performance of brand 
stocks needs to be updated and also other than American brands, such as European and Asian 
brands, need to be studied in order to understand whether brand owner firms in different 
continents perform similarly.  
 
1.2 Research problem  
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the relationship between strong brands and stock returns. In 
my research I attempt to answer the following research question: 
“Do strong brands i.e. brands included in the Interbrand Global Top 100 
Brands ranking list outperform the stock market in the long run?” 
If as hypothesized, excess returns are generated by strong brands, I further aim to answer the 
following additional questions: 
“Do the hypothesized excess returns caused by brand value and brand ranking 
list inclusion disappear eventually as the market learns about the relevance of brand value 
and brand rankings?” 
And 
“Does brand value-weighting of portfolio returns enhance the excess returns; in 
other words, do owners of particularly strong brands with the highest brand values earn 
higher excess returns than owners of weaker brands with smaller brand values, which drives 
up the overall brand portfolio return?” 
This thesis contributes to existing research on the relationship between brands and stock 
market performance by using a global brand ranking list as a primary data source for the past 
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nine years, which has not been done before. Hence, I test the explanatory power of Madden et 
al.’s (2006) research done on top American brands during 1994-2001 on global brands during 
2001-2009. Following Madden et al. (2006), I use the brand ranking lists published by 
Interbrand during the past nine years to avoid opportunistic bias. Selecting stocks from a 
brand ranking list, allows me to analyze firms with proven emphasis on branding actions, 
since Interbrand’s brand ranking list distinguishes companies according to their brand equity 
building. I further expand Madden et al.’s (2006) research by studying global, North 
American, European and Asian brand portfolios separately. Moreover, I test whether excess 
returns disappear eventually following Edmans’ (2011) study on employee satisfaction. In 
addition, following Edmans (2011) I test how newcomers on the brand ranking list perform 
and whether the performance of the most strongest brands that remain on the list during the 
entire study period differ from the original brand portfolio. Finally, I use three different 
portfolio weighting methods, market value-, equal- and brand value-weighting, instead of 
solely traditional market value-weighting, to attain robust results.  
 
1.3 Empirical study 
 
The relationship between brands and stock market performance is studied empirically by 
univariate analysis of raw portfolio returns and statistically by regression analysis. I form a 
brand portfolio annually during nine years according to Interbrand’s Best Global Brands 
ranking list. Monthly excess returns for the market value-, equal- and brand value-weighted 
portfolios are compared to the risk-free rate, the market portfolio return and an industry-
matched benchmark portfolio. After running the traditional CAPM regression, the brand 
portfolio returns are adjusted for risk with the Fama-French three factor model, which tests 
for the size and value anomalies. The robustness of the results is tested by forming two 
additional portfolios of the sample, testing for longevity of excess returns and forming a 
winsorized portfolio, where the best and worst performing stocks are eliminated from the 
sample to ensure that they do not drive the statistical results.     
This study suffers from a few limitations out of which the most relevant is the omitted 
variable bias. This refers to the situation where an additional variable, which is not included 
in the risk model, causes the results instead of the explanatory variable (the brand in this case). 
In addition, the sample size in this thesis is rather small, consisting of approximately 80 
stocks per year. This naturally decreases the credibility of the statistical regression results.  
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1.4 Results 
 
I find that American brand stocks outperform the market index after controlling for risk 
factors, portfolio weighting methods and outliers. On the contrary, results for European and 
Asian brand stocks lack significance, which causes the main hypothesis to be rejected. The 
excess returns do not seem to disappear eventually as the alphas remain positive throughout 
the first five years of the study period. Furthermore, I conclude that brand value-weighting 
does not enhance excess returns on average, but instead tends to decrease the alphas. Results 
suggest that brands are assimilated differently by the stock market in North America than in 
Europe and Asia.    
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
 
This thesis is structured in the following way. Section 2 covers the main concepts and prior 
research from the fields of marketing and finance related to intangible assets and especially 
brands, and aims to link these two research areas together. In section 3 the hypotheses are 
presented whereas Section 4 discusses the data and methods used. Finally, section 5 presents 
the core analysis and results. Robustness tests are discussed in section 6 and finally section 7 
concludes and provides ideas for further research. 
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2 Prior research and theoretical motivation for why brands might be 
related to excess returns 
 
This section is divided into four parts comprising of background information about brands 
and prior finance research relating to brands and other intangibles. The first subsection 
presents the definitions for intangible assets and brands, and in addition introduces brand 
related concepts relevant for the thesis. The second subsection discusses potential reasons for 
why brands might be related to excess returns. After this, the most relevant prior research is 
presented and finally the fourth subsection discusses brand investing, which links the thesis 
into practical life.  
 
2.1 Brands and essential concepts 
 
In this subsection I discuss the most essential concepts related to brands, starting from defying 
an intangible asset and moving on to defying a brand. After this I present two brand equity 
models that aim to demonstrate the link between brands and creation of shareholder value. 
Finally, I move on to discussing the financial nature of brands and briefly introduce the core 
idea of brand valuation. 
  
2.1.1   Definition of an intangible asset  
 
An asset is broadly defined as any physical, organizational or human attribute that enables a 
firm to generate and execute strategies that enhance its efficiency and effectiveness in the 
marketplace (Barney, 1991). According to International Accounting Standards, an asset is a 
resource controlled by a firm as a result of past events and which is expected to generate 
economic benefits in the future (IAS 38). Assets can be either tangible or intangible, included 
in the balance sheet or not, and internally or externally created (Constantin et al., 1994). 
However, the value of an asset, whether tangible or intangible, is realized, directly or 
indirectly, in the external marketplace. Srivastava et al., (1998) conclude that in order to 
create value, an asset has to be firstly, convertible to exploit an opportunity and/or to prevent 
threat, secondly possessed only by a few firms, thirdly difficult to imitate by competitors and 
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finally it should not have perfect substitutes, which guarantees that competitors cannot create 
similar assets.       
An intangible asset can be defined as an identifiable, non-monetary asset lacking physical 
substance (Troberg, 2007). Examples of intangible assets are brands, technology, customer 
loyalty, human capital and employees’ commitment (Barth et al., 1998). Wild et al. (2003) on 
the other hand have categorized intangible assets in the following way: 
 Goodwill 
 Patents, Copyrights, Tradenames and Trademarks 
 Leases, Leaseholds and Leasehold Improvements 
 Exploration Rights and Natural Resource Development Costs 
 Special Formulas, Processes, Technologies and Designs 
 Licenses, Franchises, Memberships and Customer Lists 
IAS 38 has set three critical requirements for intangible assets, which are identifiability, 
control over a resource and existence of future economic benefits. If these criteria are not met, 
an asset cannot be recognized on the balance sheet, which is the case for internally created 
brands for instance. Unlike the financial values of tangible assets, which are rather simple to 
determine, the future tangible benefits of intangible assets face high uncertainty. Despite the 
vague nature of intangible assets, they represent today one of the firm’s most valuable assets 
(Wild et al., 2003).   
In accounting, IFRS 3 states that only acquired intangible assets are recognized on the balance 
sheet whereas internally generated intangible assets are not. The primary reason behind 
excluding these intangible assets on the balance sheet is the difficulty of measuring their 
financial values reliably. To solve this problem, several brand focused consultancies have 
emerged during the past few decades who have attempted to come up with credible brand 
valuation models. However, until today, not one of the models is recognized as an official 
model by the International Accounting Standards.  
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2.1.2 Definition of a brand 
 
Probably the most remarkable intangibles assets are brands due to their undeniable power that 
affects consumer behavior and therefore also the financial performance of firms. For years, 
marketing scholars have recognized the significance of cultivating and maintaining brand 
presence and awareness to evoke consumers to develop loyalty to a company’s products 
(Kotler, 2000). Brand related factors such as brand advertising, brand age and brand entry 
order have been argued to form a significant proportion of a company’s intangible assets. For 
instance, Simon et al. (1993) state that over 80% of the intangible asset value of food-
processing companies is formed by brands.    
In the early days, brands were known primarily as logos. However, today the concept of brand 
is associated with several different matters. Kotler et al. (2004) state the meaning of a brand in 
the following way: 
 “A brand is a name, term, sign, symbol or design or combinations of them 
which is intended to identify the goods or services of one seller to differentiate them from 
those of competitors” 
Other definitions of the brand include the following: 
 “A distinctive name with which a consumer has a high level of awareness and a 
willingness to pay either a higher price than on average or make a higher than otherwise 
purchase frequency” Barth et al. (1998). 
and 
 “Brand asset is a name and/or symbol (a design, a trademark and a logo) used 
to uniquely identify the goods or services of a seller from those of its competitors, with a view 
to obtaining wealth in excess of that obtainable without a brand” Tollington (2002).  
Kotler (2000) states, that the most enduring aspects of a brand are its values, culture and 
personality. These can be thought of as the “brand DNA”, the innermost idea of the brand. To 
conclude, brands encompass tangible and intangible attributes that appropriately differentiate 
products (Murphy, 1990). These attributes cause consumers to either pay a premium for the 
branded product or service or alternatively purchase the product or service more frequently.  
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2.1.3 Brand equity models 
 
In this subsection, I first discuss the current relationship between marketing and finance, after 
which I briefly present the concept of shareholder value, made famous by Alfred Rappaport in 
1986. Then I introduce two brand equity models, one by Aaker (1994) and the other by 
Srivastava et al. (1998). Additionally, I elaborate how these models have been further 
exploited in other studies.     
Traditionally, the purpose of marketing activities has been seen as increasing the success of 
products in the marketplace. The financial results of marketing efforts have been measured by 
the increase of sales volume, market share and gross margin. However, recently the top 
management of firms has set the enhancement of shareholder returns as a goal also for 
marketers. Measuring the net present value of cash flows has become an additional indicator 
of the effectiveness of marketing actions. (Day et al., 1988.) Hence, marketers have realized 
that assets like the customer base and distribution channels have to be effectively transformed 
into returns for shareholders (Hunt et al., 1995). Altogether, organizations should understand 
the financial consequences of their marketing actions.  
Aaker et al. (1994) argue interestingly that the weak link between finance and marketing 
causes corporate funding to shun marketing departments. Marketing managers in general find 
it difficult to justify the need for funding since the results of marketing actions are difficult to 
plausibly quantify. This results in limited investment in marketing and therefore might restrict 
the creation of shareholder value. This argument is supported by Srivastava et al. (1998) who 
point out, that marketing expenditures, unlike other capital expenditure, cannot be depreciated 
over time, but have to be expensed, i.e. paid immediately. This causes marketing related 
assets to be undervalued and not highly appreciated inside organizations.   
The concept of shareholder value was first introduced by Alfred Rappaport in 1986. He states 
that a company creates value for its shareholders when the shareholder return exceeds the 
required return on equity. In other words, shareholders' money should be used to earn a higher 
return than what shareholders can earn by themselves by investing in other assets carrying the 
same amount of risk. The return to shareholders or shareholder value is formed out of two 
components; the present value of cash flows during the growth period and the long-term 
terminal value of the business at the end of the growth period. This valuation method used to 
determine firm value is known as the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model, which is one of 
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the most common models used in practice in the financial world (Palepu et al., 2007). The 
growth period is a period of time for which future cash flows can be estimated reliably 
enough, usually ten years at the maximum. However, in practice equity analysts and other 
finance professionals are able to estimate cash flows for a maximum of five years due to the 
difficulty of forecasting the future state of the economy. Hence, a significant proportion of 
firm value rests on the future growth potential of the firm and different risk factors that are 
associated to the future performance.  
Srivastava et al. (1998) introduce a set of principles that create shareholder value. First of all, 
cash flows should be created as quickly as possible. The acceleration of cash flows is 
important because the risk involved and the time value of money decrease the value of later 
cash flows. Secondly, cash flow has to be increased. This may result either from higher 
revenues or from lower costs, working capital and fixed investments. Thirdly, the risk 
associated with cash flows should be minimized. This can be reached by decreasing the 
volatility and vulnerability of cash flows, which leads to stable and predictable cash flows. In 
addition, lower risk results in a lower cost of capital or discount rate, which is used in 
calculating the present value of future cash flows. Finally, the long-term residual value of 
business activities should be enhanced with for instance investing in high customer loyalty 
and expanding the customer base or product range.    
In marketing literature the term brand equity refers to the ultimate strength of a brand that 
leads to tangible value generated by all the branding actions a firm engages in. Keller (1993) 
defines brand equity as marketing effects uniquely attributable to a brand. Examples of 
branding actions are creating brand awareness through advertising and other means of 
promotion, investing in the high quality of products and services and emphasizing customer 
satisfaction through a successful customer experience. During the past two decades marketing 
researchers have attempted to construct a clear link between marketing actions, specifically 
those related to branding, and finance. Interest towards and motivation for brand equity 
research stems ultimately from the need to estimate the value of brands for accounting, 
merger, acquisition and divestiture purposes as well as to improve the productivity of 
marketing (Keller, 1993). Thus, economic aspects are essential also in brand research.  
According to Aaker (1991) brand equity creates competitive advantage, which again leads to 
future revenue streams. Aaker’s (1995) brand equity model below demonstrates the tangible 
outcomes created by brand equity and how they further lead to enhanced firm value. Brand 
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equity is formed out of five attributes: Brand loyalty, brand awareness, perceived quality, 
brand associations and other proprietary brand assets. Each of these lead to clear tangible 
outcomes for instance reduced marketing costs, new customers, commitment to brand, price 
premiums, brand extensions and overall competitive advantage. In the end of the chain, 
financial advantages are manifested as efficiency and effectiveness of marketing efforts, 
higher margins due to premium pricing and high volume and sales increase generated by 
brand extensions.   
Figure 1: Aaker's (1995) Brand equity model 
The Figure below presents the brand equity model of Aaker (1995) where brand equity is formed out of five 
attributes: Brand loyalty, brand awareness, perceived quality, brand associations and other proprietary brand 
assets. These attributes create tangible outcomes for a firm, which are presented in the middle column of the 
model. Finally, the tangible outcomes transform into value for customers and for shareholders. The red circle 
emphasizes the creation of shareholder value, which is essential in this thesis.    
 
(Aaker, 1995 in his book “Building Strong Brands” ) 
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Aaker’s (1995) brand equity model has also been used in empirical research. For instance, 
Kim et al. (2003) study the relationship between Aaker’s brand equity attributes and the 
financial performance in a luxury hotel atmosphere. They find that brand loyalty, awareness 
and image have a significant positive effect on profitability whereas quality is not linked to 
financial performance. Thus, the brand in itself and emphasizing its “DNA” should be the 
core strategies in reaching good financial results and not overreached quality management. 
However, changes in quality perceptions among heavy users have a significant affect in 
financial performance suggesting that customer retention is one of the most effective ways to 
increase firm value (Thomson et al., 2004).   
Srivastava et al. (1998) introduce the term of market-based assets, which refer to assets that 
are created in the interface of the firm and entities operating in the external environment. 
These assets can be divided into relational and intellectual market-based assets. Relational 
assets are formed from the relationship between the firm and its key external stakeholders.  
Examples of these are brands and channel equity out of which the former is created by good 
customer relationships and the latter results from successful business partner relationships. 
Intellectual assets are on the other hand different types of knowledge a firm possesses from its 
business environment including competitors, customers, suppliers and channels. A mutual 
aspect of these two types of market-based assets is their intangible nature. They cannot be 
inventoried, but instead they can be measured by their stock, which is the specific amount of 
information possessed by a firm for example about customers’ purchase criteria or by their 
flow, which is the increase or decrease in the value of stock. 
Following Aaker’s (1995) brand equity model, Srivastava et al. (1998) state that market-based 
assets create value in the following five ways:  
1. Good relationships with and knowledge of customers, suppliers and 
channels lead to lower service and sales costs; 
2. Brand and channel equity enable the firms to charge a premium on their 
products and services; 
3. Customer loyalty and switching costs build barriers to entry for competitors; 
4. Other resources become more productive for instance as loyal customers 
respond to marketing efforts with ease; 
5. A strong brand can be expanded into new product categories and markets.  
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The entire process of shareholder value creation by market-based assets is illustrated in Figure 
2 below. In this model, shareholder value is equal to higher, less volatile cash flow, which is 
reasonable because operative cash flow is the ultimate measure of financial performance of 
the raw core business that a firm engages into. Hence, if cash flow is weak or negative the 
firm is unprofitable and therefore destroys the investment that shareholders have made in the 
firm.   
Figure 2: Linking market-based assets to shareholder value 
This Figure presents Srivastava et al.’s (1998) model describing the relationship between market-based assets, 
market performance and shareholder value. Market-based assets are defined as brands and other similar types of 
intangible assets relating to marketing. This model demonstrates how these market-based assets improve firm 
performance in various ways, which further on translates into improved cash flow generation and hence 
increases shareholder value. 
(Srivastava et al., 1998)  
The Srivastava et al. (1998) model is widely supported by prior research. Among others, 
Keller (1993) argues that customers are likely to respond quickly to marketing efforts if the 
brand awareness is high and the brand attitude is positive. Zandan (1992) finds that personal 
computer firms with strong images namely IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Compaq experience 
three to six months faster adoption of their next-generation products than competitors with a 
weaker image. Therefore, sales and marketing costs are lower for strong brands. Bowen et al. 
(1998) state that loyal customers are less likely to switch to a competitor solely because of 
price. Furthermore, they conclude that loyal customers tend to make more frequent purchases 
than non-loyal customers.  
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The generation of profitable growth is today in the center of the corporate world. Brands 
contribute to growth primarily through product development (line and category extensions) 
and market development (new channels and geographic markets) (Keller et al., 2006). Brand 
extensions enable firms to fill out their product ranges, expand into new markets and license 
brand names to be used in other product categories (Srivastava et al., 1998). Extensions are a 
natural way to capitalize on the initial investment made to the existing brand. It is important 
to note however, that branding actions include also risks. One of the largest concrete risk 
factors among different branding actions is the overextension of the brand, which results in 
poor fit between product categories and the parent brand. A too wide product range with too 
many price points might dilute the value of the brand as the messages of different products are 
inconsistent. In a situation like this, customers become confused and no longer understand the 
core idea of the brand. Studies have shown that extensions are more successful for well-
known prestigious brands that can also expand to more diverse categories. In addition, brands 
present in various product categories due to previous extensions can more easily continue to 
extend further. (e.g. Aaker et al., 1990; Keller et al., 1992.)  
Co-branding and co-marketing alliances are also a way to increase consumers’ exposure to the 
brand and hence revenues (Bucklin et al., 1993). Sharing brands and customer bases enables 
firms to lower operational costs by leveraging on the other firm’s existing resources, increase 
revenues by reaching new markets or offering new products and avoiding the fixed 
investment costs of creating a new brand or extensions (Srivastava et al., 1998). It has been 
estimated that the introduction of a new brand costs approximately $100 million and has a 50% 
chance of failure (e.g. Ourusoff, 1993).       
Barth et al. (1998) argue that the net effect of all brand benefits is that branded products 
generate higher operating earnings over time than unbranded products. Thus, strong brands 
provide tangible outcomes such as cost savings, better margins, a loyal customer base and the 
option to increase and diversify business with the introduction of new products and entering 
new geographical markets. These all should translate into increased and more stable and 
predictable cash flows that result in higher returns for shareholders.  
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2.1.4 Brands and financial metrics 
 
Until today, brand focused marketing studies have concentrated mainly on qualitative 
research exploring how brand equity affects consumer behavior for instance. In contrary, 
limited effort has been put in exploring the financial, legal and social impacts of brands. 
When studying the financial outcomes of branding actions, the stock price, the market 
capitalization and the Tobin’s q ratio are critical metrics (Keller et al., 2006). In this 
subsection, I briefly discuss the relationship between intangibles assets and the 
aforementioned financial variables.   
A financial ratio closely related to the relationship between the market value of a firm and its 
tangible and intangible assets is the Tobin’s q created by James Tobin in 1969. Tobin’s q is 
calculated as the ratio of the market value of a firm and the replacement cost of its tangible 
assets meaning property, plant, equipment, inventory, cash and investments in stocks and 
bonds (Tobin, 1969, 1978). Firms that have a Tobin’s q-value of 1.0 do not hold any 
intangible assets because the market value of the firm equals exactly the replacement cost of 
the firm’s tangible assets. Thus, no surplus is left for intangible assets. In this case earnings 
and cash flows are generated sufficiently only to realize a competitive return on invested 
capital (Kerin et al., 1998). On the contrary, firms with a Tobin’s q ratio above 1.0 have a 
competitive advantage in relation to their peers and hence generate excess return on invested 
capital. A high Tobin’s q ratio is therefore a sign of the possession of intangible assets.  
This view is supported by a study done by Lindenberg et al. (1981) who discover that firms 
producing undifferentiated commodity products have lower Tobin’s q ratios than firms 
producing packaged consumer goods. Furthermore, Hirschey et al. (1985) find a positive 
relationship between R&D and advertising expenditures and the market value of a firm and 
Tobin’s q-ratios. In addition, q-values vary according to the amount of intangible assets 
(Morck et al., 1988).  
If brands are a credible source of future earnings and cash flows, their value should be taken 
into account when calculating the market value of the stock. Supporting this argument, Kerin 
et al. (1998) state that firms are worth more in financial terms when intangible assets are 
taken into account than if they are disregarded. This leads to the hypothesis that firms with 
intangible assets and a Tobin’s q ratio above 1.0 create also shareholder value. A firm creates 
wealth for its shareholders when its market value of equity capital exceeds the book value of 
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its assets (i.e. M/B ratio > 1.0) (Varaiya et al., 1987). Hence, an M/B ratio of 1.0 sustains 
shareholder value and a ratio below 1.0 destroys it.  
Capraro et al. (1997) study M/B ratios of Fortune 500 companies and find that ratios are 
approximately 3.5 suggesting that more than 70% of the market value of these companies lies 
in intangible assets. Also Simon et al. (1993) argue that the difference between the market 
value of a firm and the book value of its assets or their replacement cost is attributable to 
intangible assets. Lane et al. (1995) continue that intangible assets such as brand names 
provide a firm the opportunity to create earnings beyond those generated by tangible assets 
only. Moreover, Lusch et al. (1994) state that intangibles such as corporate culture, customer 
relationships and brand equity are strongly linked to firm performance. However, these 
arguments incorporate the belief that intangible assets such as brands are assimilated by the 
stock market. However, still today firms focus mainly in tangible assets when monitoring and 
evaluating company performance due to the lack of valuation models of intangible assets. In 
the next subsection, I shed light on the concept of brand value and attempts made to create a 
plausible valuation method for brand assets.  
 
2.1.5 Brand value and valuation methods 
 
The idea of quantitative brand value is not the most essential matter in my thesis because the 
brand values assigned by an independent brand agency are taken as given and not analyzed 
critically. However, brand value and brand valuation methodologies are discussed briefly in 
this subsection because the data used in this thesis is closely related to these concepts. Later 
on in subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, Interbrand as an independent brand agency and their brand 
valuation methodology are presented in more detail.  
To better understand whether brands are beneficial for firm value and shareholders, they need 
to be measured with a quantitative approach. Moreover, an interesting question is whether 
brands lead to tangible outcomes, which are valued by the stock market, such as increased 
sales, new products and new markets for existing products? It is generally accepted that 
successful, established brand names are corporate assets with a financial value that creates 
shareholder value (Aaker, 1996). During the mid-1980’s M&A boom, brands become relevant 
as acquirers paid eight to ten times the amount of the target firm’s earnings (Kerin et al., 
1998). These premiums were seen as the price of the target’s intangible assets, meaning 
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primarily brands. For example in 1989 a Cadbury Schweppes executive noted that out of the 
$220 million acquisition price of the Procter & Gamble owned soft-drink business Hires and 
Crush, only $20 million accounted for the physical assets. The remainder was referred to as 
“brand value” (Schlossberg, 1990).  
Murphy (1990) argue that brand value is the value of earnings and cash flows that can be 
clearly linked to a successful established branded product or service. On the other hand, brand 
value can be understood as the financial accounting concept “value-in-use”, which is the firm 
value attributable to a specific asset managed by firm-specific skills (Barth et al., 1995). 
Haigh et al. (1997) state that brand value represents the financial worth of a brand to its 
current owner.   
Several independent brand agencies have created methods to assign numeric value for brands. 
In general, we arrive to an estimation of brand value by first identifying and isolating future 
earnings and cash flows attributed to a brand from the total future earnings and cash flows of 
the firm. After this, the future “brand earnings and cash flows” are discounted using the risk-
adjusted cost of capital rate to arrive to the net present brand value (Kerin et al., 1998). Often 
“brand earnings” are distinguished from earnings generated by unbranded products of peer 
firms producing generic products. For instance, sales of Gillette razors would be compared to 
sales of unbranded razors. As a rule of thumb, brand earnings have to form at least 5 – 10% of 
the owner firm’s sales to assure credibility (Simon et al., 1993).    
Brand strength on the other hand is used to determine the appropriate discount rate for 
calculating the net present value of brand earnings. Brand strength is measured by using both 
qualitative and quantitative factors including brand recognition, leadership, loyalty, growth 
potential, geographical spread, stability, market, trend, financial and marketing support and 
international trademark protection (Lefton et al., 1996; Andrew, 1997). A high level of brand 
strength signifies a high probability of maintaining brand earnings in the future. This is 
concretized by applying a lower discount rate when calculating the net present value of brand 
earnings.   
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2.2 Reasons behind excess stock returns 
 
Excess return of a stock is the abnormal stock return above the risk free rate or an appropriate 
benchmark index. Theories explaining equity returns are linked to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis as well as to the rationality of investors. The most common reasons mentioned in 
previous research concerning intangible assets and excess returns, are the mispricing 
assumption and the compensation for additional risk-bearing assumption. I discuss these two 
in the following two subsections.  
     
2.2.1 Mispricing of stocks 
 
In general, mispricing is a common factor used to explain excess returns. If an asset is known 
to have a positive effect to the firm’s future net cash flows, then the value of this asset should 
be reflected in the observed market value of the firm (Hall et al., 2005). Traditionally, the 
market value of a stock can be defined as the present value of future cash flows discounted at 
a suitable interest rate and adjusted for inflation and risk (Copeland et al., 1994). Also Kerin 
et al. (1990) agree that cash flow has a crucial role in determining a firm’s market value in the 
financial markets.   
According to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), a share price fully reflects all the 
available information on expected cash flows to shareholders. Thus, the market value of a 
stock is seen as the most accurate measure of a firm’s tangible and intangible assets. (Fama, 
1970, 1991.) If capital markets are perfect, the share price reacts immediately to all new 
information that has a significant effect on firm valuation. Therefore, a tangible variable that 
is beneficial to firm value will immediately be capitalized by investors and hence will not 
result in mispricing of the stock. 
According to Edmans (2011) firms with high employee satisfaction (i.e. firms included in the 
“America’s Best Places to Work” ranking list) have higher firm value, but the stock market 
fails to capitalize on this information immediately. Moreover, he argues that intangibles only 
affect the stock price when they later on translate into tangible outcomes that are again valued 
by the stock market. Based on the previously presented brand equity models, it is reasonable 
to believe that brands do have tangible consequences such as increased future sales because 
branded products are easier to sell. Additionally, a firm with a recognizable global brand can 
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expand into new markets more easily than its generic competitor, which further increases 
turnover and provides stability through geographical diversification.  
Edmans (2011) suspects that an alternative explanation behind mispricing and excess returns 
is the ranking list inclusion per se causing for instance socially responsible mutual funds to 
buy these stocks. He finds however that this reasoning explains only 0.02% of the annual 
outperformance due to the small amount of SRI funds, which causes their purchases not to 
have real price impact. Furthermore, he finds that institutional investors underweight 
companies on the ranking list. Thus, institutional ownership does not explain outperformance 
either. Also, Frieder et al. (2005) find that institutional holdings are significantly and 
negatively related to a term that captures brand recognition. In the case of brands, there are 
some mutual funds that invest in global brands and luxury brands because they believe these 
stocks to outperform the market due to several different reasons, which I will discuss later in 
section 2.4.  However, testing whether brand focused mutual funds’ purchases are behind 
hypothesized excess returns is out of the scope of this thesis. Moreover, Edmans’ (2011) 
conclusion about the small number of SRI funds is presumed to hold also for brand mutual 
funds, which decreases the reasonability of studying their purchases in detail.     
A high brand value and brand ranking might act also as a proxy for other firm characteristics 
that may cause overperformance in the stock market. A known brand can be used as a 
recruitment tool in attracting motivated and talented workforce as well as more competent 
management. Firms with a high brand value also tend to have solid financial performance due 
to their large market shares, which may result in investments in R&D, advertising and other 
intangible matters. Hence, brand value might correlate positively with other intangibles. 
Especially the nature of brands and building brand equity can be seen similar to the nature of 
R&D investments. It is thus reasonable to assume that since prior research has found a link 
between intangibles and stock market overperformance, similar results should arise in this 
thesis. However, the correlation between brands and other intangible assets is not investigated 
in this thesis, but would be a promising area of future research. 
Edmans (2011) also mentions a hypothesis that states that superior returns might be a 
correction of temporary undervaluation instead of a direct benefit of employee satisfaction. 
This hypothesis stems from the belief that the market assimilates satisfaction or some other 
intangible attribute as a wasteful expenditure having a negative effect on shareholder value. 
This notion reduces the initial valuation of the stocks. This approach has been supported by 
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Hong et al. (2009) who find that “sin” stocks’ abnormal returns were caused by their initial 
undervaluation. However, I do not examine whether brand stocks traded at a discount 
compared to their peers at the beginning of the study period.  
However, the mispricing of a firm with a high brand value might not be permanent. Edmans 
(2011) finds that the returns for firms included in the “America’s Best Places to Work” 
ranking list decline sharply in the fifth year even for firms that remain on the list for all five 
years. Furthermore, buying stocks that drop from the list or alternatively not updating the 
portfolio according to the most current list, results in lower returns than when the portfolio is 
updated annually. Edmans (2011) argues that there are two reasons behind this. First of all, 
the firms included in the list vary during different years. This results the value of intangibles 
and therefore also their mispricing to fall over time. Secondly, the market may learn about the 
true value of intangible assets as they materialize into positive tangible outcomes. This again 
leads the stock market to correct the underpricing.  
 
2.2.2 Brands as risk factors 
 
Brand stocks may experience initial underpricing also because brands can be seen as risk 
factors. Chan et al. (2001) argue that due to the longer lasting benefits of R&D investments 
compared to benefits resulting from tangible assets, the risk profile of a R&D investment is 
different from that of a physical investment. Also Saarela (2005) states that since R&D 
investments are typically more intensive in the early stage, the level of disclosure to investors 
is lower than for tangible investments. Berk et al. (2004) describe R&D-intensive firms to 
experience risks relating to the uncertainty of the success of R&D investments and the time 
and money needed to complete R&D projects. In addition, there are risks associated with 
actions of competitors and changes in the operating environment. Several researchers have 
aimed to prove that excess returns related to R&D intensity are caused by these additional 
risks. Chambers et al. (2002) find constant, but volatile excess returns of 3.5-4.9% on average 
lasting up to ten years for R&D-intensive companies. They argue that these persistent excess 
returns cannot be resulting from mispricing, but risk-bearing on the contrary. Also Ho et al. 
(2004) conclude that US-listed R&D-intensive firms have greater systematic risk caused by 
greater business and operating risks of these firms.     
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Most of these risks related to R&D investments are also interlocking with brands. A company 
possessing a valuable trademark, is naturally increasingly dependent on the future success of 
the trademark. For instance, think about what would happen to The Coca-Cola Company or 
for Microsoft if their brands suddenly lost their reputation entirely. This would inevitably lead 
to plunged company performance and a stock price nosedive because these companies’ 
business leans on the positive image of their globally recognized brands. It might be difficult 
to imagine a situation where Coca-Cola would lose its position as the ultimate favorite soft 
drink in the world, but it is not unthinkable. Brands are first and foremost recognized in 
consumers’ minds and they are strongly linked to universal trends and the general lifestyle 
that continuously evolve in the global marketplace. Consumer behavior theories also state that 
large masses of consumers follow “opinion leaders” and “early adapters”, who decide what is 
trendy to consume at the moment. Hence, purchase behavior is a sum of trends and what is 
seen as “cool” by the “innovators” and “early adapters” consumer groups. (Kotler et al., 2006.)  
To strengthen the plausibility of the brand risk standpoint, we can look at the cases of some 
brands that have once been prestigious and highly ranked on various brand ranking lists, but 
who have lost their market positions due to lost essence of their brands. Nokia for instance 
was once a synonym for a mobile phone, but has during the past few years lost its leading 
position to other players, namely Apple, Research In Motion and Samsung whose brands are 
seen as more trendy, exciting and modern in relation to Nokia. Another example is American 
International Group, AIG, which is one of the worst performing brands once listed on the 
Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list. AIG lost its position in the turmoil of the 
American subprime crisis in 2008. A third example is Eastman Kodak Company, the once 
leading camera producer that failed to innovate and get a grip of the digital camera trend and 
hence ran into financial difficulties. The reasons behind the failures of these three companies 
are manifold and not only related to their brand image. However, the rallying point of these 
three cases is the inability to manage the brand successfully in the changing business 
environment. A leading brand can lose its position quickly if the company fails to rejuvenate 
the brand and keep it constantly up-to-date.            
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2.3 Prior research 
 
Prior research concerning intangible assets and especially brands is rather limited, but can be 
divided into two groups. First, I present briefly research covering the credibility of numeric 
brand values. These studies use the numeric brand value data provided by brand ranking lists 
and aim to figure out whether brand value is related to firm performance. Even though I do 
not use actual brand values, but only firms included in the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands 
ranking list as data in my thesis, it is important to certify that brand ranking lists are a credible 
source of information and that brand values are not completely insubstantial. Though I do not 
analyze specific brand values assigned for firms included in the Interbrand Global Top 100 
Brands ranking list, but take them as given, it is important that “the right 100” brands are 
included in the list. The relative order of the brands on the list is unimportant since all 100 
brands are included in the data sample as long as they are publicly listed and have share price 
data available. However, the brand values are used as portfolio weights besides market value 
weights and equal weights to test whether their alleged relevance holds in this study.  
The second part of prior research concentrates on the relationship between brands and other 
intangible assets and the stock performance. Also, studies based on other types of ranking lists 
are discussed because these are of similar nature than my thesis studying brand ranking list 
participants.  
 
2.3.1 Studies on the credibility of numeric brand values  
 
Value relevance of accounting data refers to measuring the relationship between accounting 
information and different market variables (Easton, 1999). Thus, information that better 
explains the price or return is argued to be value relevant, i.e. better reflected in a firm’s stock 
price. The majority of value relevance research on intangible assets concentrates on intangible 
assets, whose financial value is determined by outside parties or researchers and which are not 
recognized on the balance sheet (Kallapur et al., 2004). However, value relevance research 
suffers from the limitation of how to reliably define the financial value of intangible assets. 
Hence, brand value relevance research aspires to test whether brand values calculated by 
independent parties are reliable since at the moment there does not exist an official brand 
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value methodology, which could be used for recognizing brands on the balance sheet (Barth 
et al., 1998).      
Several researchers have demonstrated a positive correlation between brand value and firm 
performance. For instance Kerin et al. (1998) find a significant positive relationship between 
brand values and market-to-book ratios (cross-sectional correlation ratios of 0.51 and 0.54) of 
American consumer goods companies included in the Financial World magazine’s “The 
World’s Most Valuable Brands” ranking list during 1995 and 1996. The Financial World 
ranking list has been published since 1992 and it uses brand value data provided by Interbrand. 
In 1998, before the magazine went out of business, their list was the most comprehensive 
brand ranking list in the market comprising of 343 brands marketed by 180 companies 
(Badenhausen, 1997). 
Barth et al. (1998a) study brand valuations for over 300 brands published by the Financial 
World magazine during 1992-1997. In general, they find that brand values increased during 
the sample period and that brand owner firms have a high mean market-to-book ratio of 4.75 
compared to 3.18 of all American firms included in the Compustat database. This signals that 
brand owner firms have substantial amounts of unrecognized intangible assets, which is 
reasonable. The results imply that brand value is positively correlated with year-end share 
price, advertising expenses, operating margin and market share. They also find that a change 
in brand value correlates positively with the annual stock return. They conclude that brand 
value estimates conducted by an independent agency are relevant and reflected in share prices 
when controlling for book values of equity and net income. The results are statistically 
significant and hold also for the simultaneity bias, which refers to the bias of share prices 
affecting brand values.  
Moreover, Kallapur et al. (2004) study the stock market reaction to brand capitalization 
announcements of 33 U.K. firms. They state that brand assets, which were valued internally in 
the case of the 33 firms, are value relevant. In this study, brand values were calculated as the 
goodwill recognized on the balance sheet after an acquisition.  
Altogether, prior brand value relevance studies conclude that brand valuations conducted by 
independent brand agencies seem to be reliable and accurate enough to be used as a proxy for 
brand value, which accounting standards fail to recognize at the moment. However, some 
researchers (see e.g. Aaker, 1996 and Kapferer, 1997) have criticized the credibility of 
numeric brand values. Frequently cited criticisms include the methods used to estimate future 
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earnings and cash flow generated over those of a generic (non-brand) competitor and the 
choice of the discount rate based on subjective brand strength. Also brand extension potential 
and asset synergies are often overlooked in brand valuation. Despite of the weaknesses related 
to brand valuation, I conclude that the Interbrand brand ranking list is a relevant and credible 
source of information that can be used as a benchmark for strong brands also in this thesis.    
 
2.3.2 Studies on intangible assets and stock prices   
 
Whether the stock market values information related to intangible assets is controversial. 
There are a number of studies that prove that several firm characteristics correlate with excess 
returns. Lev et al. (1996) find a Fama-French risk-adjusted annual excess return of 4.57% for 
R&D-intensive American companies during 1975-1989. Also Chan et al. (2001) find a 7.83% 
annual abnormal return based on R&D relative to firm market value for American stocks 
listed in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. They also find similar results when studying advertising 
expenditure. Also Conchar et al. (2005) find a positive link between advertising and 
promotion spending and the market value of a firm, further supporting the argument that 
brand building activities are beneficial and result in better financial performance. Deng et al. 
(1999) on the other hand study patent citations and Aboody et al. (1998) software 
developments and find that these cause excess returns as well. Moreover, abnormal returns 
are caused by good corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003) while CEO’s use of a 
corporate jet results in a 3.8% negative alpha (Yermack, 2006). Sin stocks have also been 
proved to generate excess returns (e.g. Hong et al., 2009).  
Barth et al. (1998b)
 
find that firms with significant amounts of unrecognized intangible assets 
such as brands experience positive stock market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
Barth et al. (1998c)
 
again find a positive relationship between analyst coverage and the 
amount of unrecognized intangibles assets. Interestingly it has been also proven that the 
amount of intangible assets correlates positively with analysts’ forecast error and the result is 
strongest for firms possessing diverse and innovative technologies (Gu et al., 2005). Thus, the 
lack of explicit information about intangible assets and their impact on earnings causes 
analysts to make less accurate earnings forecasts and misvalue stocks.       
Edmans (2011) conclude that firms with high level of employee satisfaction (i.e. firms 
included in the “America’s Best Places to Work” ranking list) generate superior long-term 
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returns after controlling for industries, risk and a set of observable firm characteristics during 
the years 1984-2009. Hence, the market fails to incorporate intangible assets fully into stock 
valuations even though the existence of the asset is well known due to an objective 
recognition. Furthermore, he argues that an intangible asset affects the stock price only when 
it materializes into a tangible outcome valued by investors such as an earnings announcement. 
However, he states that intangibles per se are not appreciated by investors, but the 
overperformance of companies with high employee satisfaction (employee satisfaction acting 
as a proxy for an intangible asset) is a result of some other factor than high employee 
satisfaction in itself. 
Several researchers have studied the relationship between admiration, or good reputation in 
other words, and stock market performance. Though admiration is not an intangible asset per 
se, it might be closely related to brands since many firms with strong brands are often thought 
of as “good companies” and hence are often admired in the society.  Clayman (1987, 1994) 
study stocks of companies labeled excellent in Peters and Waterman’s “In search of 
excellence”, published in 1982, in two separate studies and finds opposite results. In the first 
study, excellent stocks have low returns, but in the second study they outperform the market. 
Anderson et al. (2006) and Antunovich et al. (2000) conclude that firms ranked high in the 
Fortune magazine’s annual “America’s Most Admirable Companies” ranking list generate 
higher returns than lower ranked firms. Shefrin et al. (2003) and Statman et al. (2008) on the 
other hand find that these higher ranked firms have weaker returns. Lastly, Anginer et al. 
(2010) find that firms with bad reputation generate higher returns than companies ranked high 
in the Fortune list during the years 1983-2007. Furthermore, they discover that an increase in 
admiration is followed by weaker stock market performance.  
The results of admiration studies are various and it is difficult to clearly conclude that good 
companies would beat companies with worse reputations. These results may however be 
compared to the good historical performance of sin stocks, which namely are companies with 
shady reputations. It may be that low ranked firms of an admiration list outperform the higher 
ranked ones because these firms may operate in unethical industries such as alcohol, tobacco 
and firearms. Admiration and brand strength may appear to be closely related because both 
are in general seen as positive attributes and materialize in increased publicity and familiarity. 
However, a brand is an intangible asset, which may if managed successfully, result in tangible 
financial outcomes. On the contrary, admiration per se is not an asset in legal terms, and it is 
difficult to prove that admiration would lead to increased sales for instance. It is also crucial 
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to note that some of the most valuable brands are alcohol and tobacco labels such as Moet & 
Chandon, Hennessy, Marlboro, Smirnoff and Budweiser. Thus, owners of these brands are sin 
stocks. Furthermore, several prestigious “non-sin” brands are owned by companies that 
operate also in the sin industries beside other industries such as LVMH (operates in alcohol) 
and Richemont (operates in tobacco and firearms). Hence, all brands owned for example by 
LVMH are indirectly related to the sin industry. This causes difficulties in determining 
whether brand stocks’ potential outperformance is caused by the brands or by the fact that 
they operate in the sin industries. Finally, many companies with strong brands have 
experienced negative publicity related to child labor (e.g. H&M and IKEA), massive layoffs 
(e.g. Nokia and Citigroup) or oil spillage (e.g. British Petroleum). To conclude, possession of 
a strong trademark does not mean necessarily having excellent firm reputation and hence the 
weak performance of admired companies should not be an indication that brand owners 
would also perform weakly.         
Research on brands and the stock market has been so far limited possibly due to the low 
appreciation of marketing by finance researchers. However, a few interesting studies about 
the relationship between brand ranking lists and excess returns in addition to event studies 
about branding events have been conducted.  
Madden et al. (2006) arrive at similar results as Edmans (2011) studying brands included in 
the Interbrand’s “World’s Most Valuable Brands” ranking list during years 1994-2001. All of 
the brands included in their study are North American brands. They find that strong brands 
generate monthly returns of 1.98% compared to 1.34% yielded by the benchmark portfolio 
consisting of all American listed companied excluding the brand stocks from Interbrand’s 
ranking list. After accounting for risk using the Carhart (1997) four factor model, they find a 
monthly alpha of 0.57%, which is statistically different from the alphas generated by the 
benchmark portfolios. Furthermore, the brand portfolio embodies significantly less systematic 
risk (market beta = 0.85) than the market in general, which has a beta of 1.0. When brand 
values are used as portfolio weights in the brand portfolio, the portfolio yield increases to 2.49% 
per month and the alpha to 1.32% while the risk remains unchanged. The results hold also 
when market shares of the firms in the brand portfolio are taken into account. Hence, Madden 
et al. (2006) conclude that brand-focused firms generate greater risk-adjusted returns 
compared to the benchmark, which provides evidence for the validity of building brand equity 
and its positive effect on shareholder value.  
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Aaker et al. (1994) find that the stock market assimilates brand quality images by observing 
how the annual stock returns of 34 global brand owner firms during 1989-1992 evolve, as the 
EquiTrend brand quality rating used as a proxy for brand equity, changes. They find that 
firms with the largest gains in their brand equity measure experience average returns of 30% 
while firms with diminished brand equity experience 10% losses. Going deeper into specific 
brand strategies and their financial consequences, Roa et al. (2004) find that firms with a 
“branded house” strategy, where the corporate brand is used as an umbrella to all firm brands, 
generate higher stock market returns than the multiple brand “house of brands” strategy. The 
higher return is rationalized as a compensation for risk due to the lack of diversification. This 
result embodies the idea of brand risk because the “branded house” strategy suffers from the 
risk of losing the value and standing of the corporate brand. On contrary, in the “house of 
brands” strategy the brand risk is diminished because the company owns several independent 
brands that have their own separate positions in the market and in the minds of consumers.  
Previous marketing research has also conducted event studies that test the stock price reaction 
to different brand related events namely new product, brand extension and celebrity 
endorsement announcements. For instance, Lane et al. (1995) discover a connection between 
brand extension announcements and stock price reactions. Their research shows that the stock 
market reacts most favorably to extensions of either highly familiar prestigious brands or 
those of low-end unfamiliar brands.  
Next, I will discuss brands from a more practical point of view. Lately, also the financial 
markets have awoken to the existence of brands and have created new types of investment 
products related to brands. Thus, investing in brands as a current phenomenon is presented in 
the next subsection. 
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2.4 Investing in brands 
 
Brands play a visible role in the everyday life of people and have caused also financial 
markets to innovate investment products based on brands. During the past few years, 
investing in well-known brands has become a trendy investment strategy. Several banks 
abroad and in Finland have introduced brand mutual funds and structured products that are 
linked to the performance of brand stocks. These mutual funds and investment products can 
be divided roughly into three different groups depending on their investment strategy and risk 
profile.  
Some funds focus on global luxury brands that benefit from the growth of emerging markets 
and the general change in consumer habits throughout the world. Funds like these carry above 
average risk because the performance of luxury companies is cyclical and hence the volatility 
of these stocks is high. Some funds on the other hand invest only in the very top range of 
global consumer goods brands such as Coca-Cola and Mc Donald’s because they are seen as 
safe and stable investments irrespective of the varying economic cycles. The Seligson & Co 
fund, Global Top 25 Brands, the FIM Brands fund and the Morgan Stanly Global Brands fund 
are examples of mutual funds following this strategy. The third option is to invest in 
consumer goods companies that are expected to benefit directly or indirectly from the growth 
of emerging markets. An example of a mutual fund utilizing this strategy is the Nordea 
Emerging Consumer Fund, which too has its largest stakes in global brands such as Toyota, 
Coca-Cola and Nestle (situation in 31.1.2011). Nordea expects the brands it invests in to gain 
market leader positions in emerging markets in the future. 
The reasons behind the expected good performance of brand funds are diverse. Demand for 
premium brands has increased during the recent years, which has led premium brand 
companies to outperform the global equity markets. This development trend is expected to 
strengthen in the future as the global population rises and ages, the number of affluent 
consumers increases, the standard of living in emerging countries rises and as consumer 
habits evolve more towards preferring high-quality luxury products. (Fim, 2011 and Pictet 
Funds, 2011.) The global population is expected to grow by 30% over the next 15 years. 
Furthermore, the population between 30-65 years old is estimated to peak in China and India 
in 2025 and 2045, respectively. (World Wealth Report, 2008.) In western countries, the 
number of old people rises as people live ever longer and birth rates on the other hand are low. 
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Seniors today are wealthier and more active than before, which leads them to spend more 
money selectively in higher quality and premium priced goods. (Pictet Funds, 2011.)  
The recent acceleration in economic growth and urbanization in emerging countries such as 
China, Russia and Eastern Europe has led to the emergence of a new upper-middle class. 
United Nations has predicted that the proportion of urban population will reach 60% of total 
population in 2030 and that 70-80 million people will climb to the middle class annually in 
emerging countries. Many of these people seek to pursue the “western life style”, which 
means buying luxury goods that demonstrate their social and economic ascension. For 
instance, according to Pictet Funds (2011) the consumption of Moet & Chandon champagne 
in China doubled from 2003 to 2004. Also Tapiola Bank (2011) states that LVMH sales from 
Asian markets increased by 20% during the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010. The 
development of emerging countries affects also travel retail significantly. The total number of 
Chinese tourists increased from 10 million in the beginning of the millennium to 28 million in 
2004. Their number grows with an annual rate of 12.8% and is expected to reach 100 million 
in 2020. This coupled with the facts that 38% of luxury purchases happen while travelling and 
that Asian tourists spend twice as much money when travelling as Europeans and Americans, 
the strong growth of premium brands should continue also outside emerging markets. (Pictet 
Funds, 2011.)  
As the population grows, so does the number of wealthy people, who form the core customer 
segment of luxury brands. According to the World Wealth Report 2008, the global wealth of 
High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI), people with financial assets at least worth of US$1 
million, is expected to grow by 7.7% annually through 2012. Other drivers of demand for 
prestigious branded goods include the improving stature of women. An increasing number of 
women work today all around the world, which guarantees them economic autonomy to 
purchase goods that act as status symbols and provide gratification in our modern-day society 
where beauty and youthfulness are requisites of success. (Pictet Funds, 2011.)   
Mutual funds focusing on premium brand firms justify their investment strategy by the higher 
earnings growth of luxury companies compared to other consumer goods producers. In 
addition, luxury companies have solid financials coupled with superior sales growth, 
operating margins and cash flow generation. Like all strong brands, despite of the price range 
of the product mix, also luxury brand firms benefit from strong pricing power, which protects 
them against rising inflation and the current difficult economic environment. Since most 
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luxury firms are in the mid- and small-cap universe and are characterized by diverse 
risk/return profiles, a winning luxury investment strategy is based on successful stock picking. 
(Pictet Funds, 2011.) Thus, the fund manager has to recognize the strongest brands with the 
highest future potential from the mass of brands operating in the highly competitive luxury 
market. Therefore, luxury funds are actively managed mutual funds. The low industry 
diversification of luxury brand funds and risks related to emerging markets result in a high 
overall risk classification. Also Nordea Bank (2011) notifies in its Emerging Consumer fund 
advertising materials that the risk classification of their fund is six on a seven step scale. 
Furthermore, they remind that the legal and institutional infrastructure in emerging countries 
develops continuously and poses several risks relating to politics, legislation, finance, 
accounting, taxation, counterparties and shareholder protection. Naturally currency risks are 
also present in mutual funds that invest in securities worldwide.  
On the contrary, mutual funds focusing in mass-market brands have a different risk profile 
and investment strategy than luxury and emerging consumer brand funds. These funds select 
their stocks based on the strength and value of the trademark and the position of the brand in 
the global markets. In the selection process fund managers use for example brand ranking lists 
published by independent brand consultancies. (Seligson & Co, 2011.) This for that matter 
provides further evidence that these ranking lists are relevant and credible. The fund 
management style is passive since the value of large strong brands rarely plunges. The 
success of these funds leans partly on the same matters discussed previously in the case of 
luxury brand and emerging consumer goods funds. The main difference is that the focus in 
these brand funds is in solid, stable, moderately growing large global companies such as 
Unilever, Google, Apple, Nokia, Procter & Gamble etc. Thus, the risk is lower than in the 
case of luxury funds.   
The performance of brand funds has been strong on average. For instance the Morgan Stanley 
Global Brands fund beat its benchmark with 18.25% during the time period April 2006 - 
January 2011 (Morgan Stanley, 2011). The Nordea Emerging Consumer fund generated a 
return of 46% during November 2008 – March 2011. The Pictet Premium Brands fund has 
earned a cumulative return of 29% during the past five years compared to a -2.7% return 
earned by its benchmark the MSCI World Discretionary during the same time period. On the 
other hand FIM Brands yielded only 2.9% during the past five years compared to its 
benchmark’s -1.4%. Furthermore, The Seligson & Co fund, Global Top 25 Brands, was 
awarded a Morningstar prize in 2011 for one of best passively managed index funds in 
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Finland. The fund beat actively managed equity funds due to the fact that the brands in the 
fund maintained their profitability during the economic crisis. (Koskinen, 2011.)          
3 Hypotheses 
 
The benefit of strong brands to firm performance is undeniable and has been widely accepted 
in marketing and accounting literature. However, it is debatable how the stock market values 
and incorporates brand values and brand ranking list information produced by an independent 
organization. Prior finance literature finds evidence that intangible assets are not fully valued 
by the stock market and hence firms with significant amounts of intangible assets might be 
undervalued (e.g. Edmans, 2011 and Chan et al., 2001). Furthermore, Madden et al. (2006) 
discover that American owner firms of strong brands included in the Interbrand “World’s 
Most Valuable Brands” ranking list during 1994-2001 generate excess returns compared to a 
relevant benchmark.  
In this thesis I continue the research of Madden et al. (2006) and study global brands included 
in Interbrand’s “Global Top 100 Brands” ranking list during the years 2001-2009, which has 
not been done before. I also extend the previous research to cover European and Asian 
companies besides North American firms included in the previous brand studies. Naturally 
following Madden et al. (2006), I assume that my thesis will generate similar results and 
hence my hypotheses stem from those presented in their paper. 
Madden et al. (2006) on the other hand base their hypothesis on several prior study results 
(e.g. Aaker et al., 1994) proving than brand development strategies create shareholder value, 
which again is demonstrated as above average stock returns. In addition, the brand equity 
models presented earlier in subsection 2.1.3 provide reasonable evidence that branding creates 
tangible financial outcomes that should have a positive effect on the company share price. 
Finally, argumentation related to socioeconomic global trends used in marketing of brand 
mutual funds suggests that brand stocks could outperform the market index. 
Edmans (2011) reasons that, if lack of information is the main reason causing excess returns 
in previous employee satisfaction studies, superior returns should not exist for companies 
ranked in the annual “America’s Best Places to Work” study because the list reveals specific 
information on several companies at once. However, it may be that even though the 
information is widely available, the stock market disregards this information, which results in 
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underpricing of the stocks included in the list. Furthermore, he points out that under a 
mispricing channel, an intangible asset affects the stock price only when it subsequently 
manifests into a tangible outcome valued by the stock market. Thus, my thesis is a joint test of 
brand equity building, which at the same time benefits firm value and fails to be fully valued 
by the stock market.    
Thus, I hypothesize:  
H1: Firms owning strong brands (i.e. brands included in the Interbrand Global 
Top 100 Brands ranking list) outperform the stock market in the long-run 
Following Madden et al. (2006), I assume that stock market returns increase when brand 
values are used as portfolio weights signaling the importance of nominal brand value 
determined by an independent agency, Interbrand in this case. Several brand value relevance 
studies (Kerin et al., 1998, Barth et al., 1998 and Kallapur et al., 2004) prove that the values 
assigned for brands by independent brand agencies are reliable and therefore using brand 
values as portfolio weights should have a positive effect on the brand portfolio’s performance 
since firms with higher brand values should outperform firms with lower brand values. This 
argument entails the belief that the strongest most prestigious brands are better investments 
than less prestigious brands. Madden et al. (2006) continue that brand value estimates should 
provide incremental information about firm performance that might be useful in investment 
decision making. Hence, a brand portfolio incorporating detailed brand value information 
(brand values are used as portfolio weights) should outperform a brand portfolio that does not 
entail this information (ordinary portfolio weights used). Thus, the following hypothesis is 
presented: 
H2: Stock market performance is enhanced when brand values are used as 
portfolio weights  
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are tested for a global brand portfolio including all the stocks of brand 
owners represented on Interbrand’s ranking list. In addition, separate regressions are run for 
North America, Europe and Asia portfolios to develop a deeper understanding of how brand 
stocks have behaved in different continents. The hypotheses H1 and H2 are equivalent for all 
regional portfolios because there is no prior evidence that brand stocks would behave 
differently in different regions. This argument is also backed up by the current global nature 
of the stock markets.   
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Following Edmans (2011), I test whether list inclusion results in superior stock market 
performance. Edmans (2011) argues that superior performance of firms included in the 
“America’s Best Places to Work” list is not generated by higher employee satisfaction, but 
potentially by the list inclusion per se. He reasons that socially responsible mutual funds, 
which have become a clear phenomenon during the past decade, screen their investments by 
using various criteria, employee satisfaction being one of them. Hence, he argues that list 
inclusion results in increased demand for the stock generated by these socially responsible 
mutual funds. Even though Edmans (2011) admits in his conclusions that these kinds of 
mutual fund purchases explain only a subtle part of the excess returns, I follow his hypothesis 
setting in my thesis. Thus, I assume that once a brand owner is included in the Interbrand list, 
the market perceives this as positive information. Furthermore, I argue that the inclusion in a 
brand ranking list may result in increased demand from brand mutual funds, which as well 
have established a presence in the mutual fund universe during the past years. Thus, following 
Edmans (2011), I hypothesize:   
H3: Newcomer brand owners included in the Interbrand “Global Top 100 
Brands” outperform the stock market in the long-run   
Finally, Edmans (2011) argues that companies with high employee satisfaction should not 
earn superior returns permanently. Firstly, the companies included in the list vary from year to 
year meaning that employee satisfaction is not permanent, but may decrease or increase over 
time. Secondly, the stock market should learn about the true value of employee satisfaction as 
it materializes into tangible outcomes. These standpoints should cause mispricing to fall over 
time. He finds the drift to list inclusion to decline over time becoming insignificant in year 
five. The results hold also for the “List remainers” portfolio consisting of stocks that stay on 
the list from the beginning to the end of the study period. Stocks in the “List remainers” 
portfolio in particular should not generate excess returns from year five onwards because the 
stock market should by this time be well aware of the true value of their intangible assets. 
Edmans (2011) finds that the “List remainers” portfolio generates smaller returns than the 
original portfolio supporting his argument of mispricing disappearing over time as the market 
learns about the relevance of intangible assets. Following these arguments presented in 
Edmans’ (2011) research, the following two hypotheses are tested: 
H4: The “List remainers” portfolio generates lower returns than the original 
global brand portfolio 
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and 
H5: The excess returns for the “List remainers” portfolio disappear eventually 
becoming insignificant in year five  
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4 Data and methodology 
 
In this section, I present the data and methods used in my thesis. I introduce Interbrand as an 
organization, their brand valuation method and the Global Top 100 Brands ranking list. I also 
explain the portfolio construction process and the statistical methods used to analyze brand 
portfolio performance.    
 
4.1 Brand valuation rankings 
 
During the past few years, the development of various brand valuation systems and rankings 
has become increasingly popular. There are several independent brand consultancies, which 
publish brand ranking lists for global brands and for brands operating in a specific country or 
industry. Interbrand, Brand Finance and Millward Brown are the three most recognized 
consultancies in the field of brand valuation and brand rankings. While all of these three have 
received international publicity, the ranking lists conducted by Interbrand and Brand Finance 
have been used most often as a source in academic research, the former to a higher degree 
than the latter. Interbrand is the oldest brand agency, founded in 1974 and its list has been 
publicly available online starting from 2001. Brand Finance on the other hand started 
conducting brand ranking lists in 2007 and Millward Brown a year earlier.  
I chose to use the Interbrand Best Global Brands ranking list as the primary brand data source 
in my thesis because it has been published for several years, the list is readily publicly 
available and the list has been used previously in several academic studies. In addition, 
Interbrand as an organization has a good reputation and is widely known globally, which 
increases the credibility of my study. In the following subsections, I discuss Interbrand and its 
brand valuation methodology in more detail. After this, I present descriptive statistics 
concerning the brands included in the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brand ranking list.  
 
4.1.1 Interbrand 
 
 
Interbrand is the world’s oldest and largest brand consultancy founded in 1974 and operates 
today 40 offices around the world. The consultancy is owned by New York based Omnicom 
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Group Inc. Interbrand is said to be the pioneer of brand valuation, which it began as early as 
1984. Brand ranking lists covering global brands on the other hand have been published since 
1999. Starting from 2001, Interbrand has partnered with Bloomberg BusinessWeek magazine, 
which publishes the Best Global Brands ranking list annually immediately after the issue of 
the list. Until 2007 the ranking list appeared in the first weekly issue of August, after which 
the publication was moved to the end of September. BusinessWeek is a leading global 
business media organization founded in 1929 and published by the McGraw-Hill Companies. 
The weekly published magazine reaches more than 4.8 million readers every week in 140 
countries. (Interbrand, 2011.) 
The Interbrand Best Global Brands ranking lists including the Top 100 Global Brands is 
publicly available starting from year 2001. The ranking list covers large companies from all 
around the world out of which roughly half are American. The basic requirement for a brand 
to be featured on the list is the true global nature of the brand meaning that at least 30 percent 
of the revenues must come from outside the home country and no more than 50 percent of 
revenues should come from any one continent. In addition, the brand must be present in at 
least three major continents and must have a broad geographic coverage also in growing and 
emerging markets. 
Interbrand’s phenomenal reputation in brand valuation is based on the facts that the firm has 
been publishing its ranking list for the longest time and the list receives more media attention 
than other brand ranking lists published by competing consultancies such as Brand Finance or 
Millward Brown. First of all, the Interbrand brand ranking list is published annually jointly 
with BusinessWeek magazine, which is a prestigious weekly magazine with a wide 
circulation. Hence, the Interbrand brand ranking list is released on a specific event date, which 
attracts widespread attention because it discloses information on several companies 
simultaneously. Moreover, the ranking list is referred to in various other international eminent 
newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal, which draws further attention to the publication. 
Furthermore, the 2010 ranking list was launched at the New York Stock Exchange in a special 
launch event on September 15, 2010. These public actions enhance the credibility of 
Interbrand as a brand ranking consultancy and prove that the stock market is aware of the 
existence of the ranking list. 
To the contrary, other intangibles causing superior long-run returns such as R&D expenditure 
and measures of corporate governance are disclosed in a company’s earnings announcements, 
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which take place during different days for different firms (e.g. Lev et al., 1996; Chan et al., 
2001; Liu et al., 2007). Thus intangibles like these and the stock market behavior relating to 
them is much more difficult to measure accurately than information about intangibles, which 
is released in the form of a ranking list.  
 
4.1.2 Interbrand brand valuation methodology  
 
In this subsection, I present in detail the methodology used by Interbrand to arrive at the 
numeric brand values assigned for brands included in their ranking lists. Interbrand’s 
methodology is probably the most acknowledged brand valuation method available today due 
to the consultancy’s long history in the area of brand consulting and brand valuation. This 
argument is supported by the fact that Interbrand received as the first brand consultancy in the 
world an ISO certification for valuing brands in December 2010 (Interbrand, 2011). The main 
idea of the Interbrand method is to look at the ongoing investment and management of the 
brand as a business asset. This refers to taking into account all the ways in which a brand 
benefits its owner organization. For instance attracting and retaining talented workforce and 
delivering on customer expectation. The methodology is composed of three main elements 
that contribute to the assessment: the financial performance of the branded products or 
services, the role of the brand in a purchase decision process and the strength of the brand. 
The formula used to calculate brand value starting from economic profit is illustrated below in 
Figure 3:  
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Figure 3: The Interbrand method for calculating brand value  
This Figure presents the method used by Interbrand to calculate brand value for a firm. The method begins by 
calculating the after tax operating profit and subtracting the weighted average cost of capital from the total. This 
generates the economic profit of the firm. Next, the economic profit is multiplied by the role of the brand to 
achieve branded earnings. Finally, brand value emerges from multiplying branded earnings by the brand strength 
discount factor. Brand strength is defined separately by another Interbrand method, which is presented later.    
The financial performance measures an organization’s raw financial return to the investors, 
which is analyzed as the economic profit. Economic profit again is determined by deducting 
taxes from the operating profit and then subtracting the industry weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC). Financial performance is forecasted for a five-year period and for the 
terminal value, which represents the brand’s expected performance beyond the forecast period. 
After this the economic profit is multiplied by the role of the brand in order to arrive to the 
branded earnings. The role of the brand reflects the portion of demand for a branded product 
or service that exceeds what the demand would be for the same product or service if it was 
unbranded.  The portion is determined by one of following three methods: primary research, a 
review of the historical roles of brands for companies in that industry or expert panel 
assessment. (Interbrand, 2011.) 
Finally, the branded earnings are multiplied by brand strength, which measures the ability of 
the brand to ensure the delivery of expected future earnings. Brand strength is determined 
through the ten dimensions presented below in Table 1 and it is reported on a 0 to 100 scale, 
where 100 points signals a perfect brand. Performance in the ten brand strength dimensions is 
judged relative to other brands in the industry, and in the case of exceptional brands, relative 
to other world-class brands. (Interbrand, 2011.) 
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Table 1: Interbrand characteristics for determining brand strength 
This Table below introduces ten characteristics that are used by Interbrand to define the strength of a brand. 
Brands are analyzed in relation to one and another. Each brand can receive a total amount of 100 points, which 
signals a perfect brand.  
 
 
4.1.3 Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list 
  
In this subsection I discuss my main data source, the Global Top 100 Brands ranking list in 
detail and describe the list characteristics. I chose the Interbrand’s Global Top 100 Brands 
ranking list as my primary data source because the list is readily available already starting 
from 2001 and hence it allows me to study historical stock prices for the past nine years. 
Another credible ranking list would have been Brand Finance’s ranking list, but since they 
have been publishing their list only for the past four years, it was not meaningful to use their 
list.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the firms included in the Interbrand Global Top 100 
Brands ranking list. The number of brand owners ranges from 92 to 95 meaning that some 
firms own several brands. These firms are namely LVMH, Procter & Gamble, Diageo, Time 
Warner, News Corporation, HP, Yum! Brands, Nestlé, L’Oréal, and Volkswagen Group. Each 
year the list includes two to seven owner firms that are privately held companies, which are 
excluded from the study. Brands belonging to these non-listed companies are IKEA, Hilton, 
Absolut Vodka, Bacardi, Rolex, Chanel, Armani, Prada and Wrigley. The final sample 
includes 78-85 listed firms each year that have stock price information available. Table 2 
10 brand strength dimensions by Interbrand 
1 Organization’s internal commitment to or belief in its brand 
2 Legal protection, design, scale and geographic spread 
3 Clear articulation of brand’s values, positioning and proposition 
4 Brand’s ability to adapt to market changes, challenges and opportunities 
5 Soundness of brand authenticity, heritage and a well-grounded value set 
6 Brand's fit with customer needs, desires and decision criteria across all appropriate demographics and 
geographies 
7 Consumers' level of in-depth understanding of brand's distinctive qualities and characteristics 
8 Degree to which a brand is experienced without fail across all touchpoints and formats 
9 Degree to which a brand feels omnipresent and how positively consumers, customers and opinion formers 
discuss it in both traditional and social media 
10 Degree to which customers perceive the brand to have a positioning that is distinct from the competition 
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shows also that each year less than ten brands are newcomers to the list. The mean and 
median estimated brand values center around 10 and 6 billion US dollars, respectively. Thus, 
not that many brands reach as high brand value as the global leader, Coca-Cola, with its $70 
billion estimated brand value. 
The top four brands, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, IBM and GE, stay unchanged for the whole nine 
year study period while the lower half of the list varies significantly while new brands enter 
the list and old brands change their respective order. 60 brands stay on the list for the entire 
nine year period while on average brands have been included in the list for seven years. 
However, some brands drop from the list every now and then and make a comeback later. 
Altogether 142 brands are featured on the list during 2001-2009. In 2001, 62% of the brands 
were American while the next popular countries were Germany, Japan and United Kingdom. 
In 2009, 52% of the brands represented the United States followed by German, French and 
Japanese brands. The most common industries in the 2001 list were Consumer Goods (33%), 
Electronics (18%), Consumer Services (13%) and Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) 
(13%). In 2009, the respective percentages were Consumer Goods (32%), Electronics (15%), 
FMCG (15%) and Finance (13%). An example of the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands 
ranking list is presented in the Appendix. 
Table 2: Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list statistics 
This Table presents the total number of owner companies and the number of publicly listed owner companies of 
the brands included in the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list during the years 2001-2009. Also the 
number of new brands on the list is mentioned. Mean and median brand value is presented for each year and also 
the percentage change of these values are included in the Table.  
Year 
Nb of 
owners 
Nb of listed 
owners New brands 
Brand value 
mean ($ bn) 
Brand value 
median 
($ bn) 
Change in 
brand value 
mean  
Change in 
brand value 
median  
2001 92 85   9.88 5.36     
2002 93 87 9 9.77 5.31 -3.06 % -1.00 % 
2003 93 88 4 9.74 5.73 0.97 % 2.00 % 
2004 93 88 8 9.96 6.30 2.46 % 3.00 % 
2005 94 89 7 10.45 6.59 0.52 % 4.00 % 
2006 94 89 2 10.93 7.17 5.78 % 6.00 % 
2007 94 90 5 11.56 7.56 6.92 % 8.00 % 
2008 94 89 7 12.14 6.76 3.83 % 5.00 % 
2009 95 89 7 11.58 7.06 -3.58 % -3.00 % 
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4.2 Share price information  
 
I study long-run stock returns instead of valuation ratios or profits for three main reasons. 
Firstly, a positive relationship between strong brands and valuation ratios or profits could be 
explained by good financial performance causing a brand to be strong. On the contrary, a 
well-performing firm should not generate superior future stock returns because profits should 
already be incorporated in the current stock price since they are tangible. Secondly, stock 
returns are a clearer demonstration of creating shareholder value through branding actions 
because they take into account all the tangible outcomes resulting from strong brand value. 
Finally, accrual accounting variables are not adjusted for risk factors and they might be 
distorted by violations of accounting laws. In this subsection, I discuss in detail how the brand 
portfolios are formed and how the stock price information is collected.  
4.2.1 Creating the brand portfolios for analysis  
 
I form altogether six brand portfolios to test my hypotheses. The main portfolio is the global 
brand portfolio consisting of all publicly listed brand owners included in the Interbrand 
Global Top 100 Brands ranking list during the years 2001-2009, which have stock price data 
available. The portfolio is annually updated according to the most current ranking list. 
Following Edmans’ (2011) methodology, for each year, the portfolio is formed after a one-
month delay from the publication of the ranking list. This gives the stock market the 
necessary time to react to the information and hence rules out the explanation of lacking 
information on intangible assets. During years 2001-2007, the ranking list was published in 
mid-July and therefore I form the portfolio starting from August 15 for these years. For years 
2008-2009 on the other hand, I form the portfolio on October 15 because the ranking list was 
published in mid-September during these two years. Hence, the overall study period ranges 
from August 15, 2001 to October 15, 2010.   
The dividend and split adjusted stock returns are retrieved from the Datastream database 
using the Return Index and by calculating the market value-, equal- and brand value-weighed 
monthly returns for the brand portfolios. Also monthly market values of the sample 
companies are gathered from Datastream. Following Edmans (2011), the brand portfolios are 
tested with both equal-weighting and market value-weighting. The use of market value-
weighting is important because the Fama and French factors (explained later in section 4.3.2) 
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are calculated also with market weights. In addition, following Madden et al. (2006) I use 
brand values as portfolio weights. Brand value-weighting allows me to test hypothesis H2, 
namely to see whether brand values effect the return of the brand portfolios instead of treating 
all firms included in the ranking list equally. Whenever a sample company owns more than 
one brand included in the Interbrand ranking list, the brand value assigned to the owner is the 
sum of all brand values of the brands it possesses.  
Besides the global brand portfolio, I form three country portfolios, the North America, Europe 
and Asia portfolios, to test whether results differ among different continents. Brands are 
placed in one of the three country portfolios based on their country of origin. Thus, 
hypotheses H1 and H2 are also tested with these three portfolios. I assume stock markets to 
behave similarly around the world; hence no hypotheses concerning the relative success of 
brand stocks in different markets are presented. To reassure that the results are robust, I form 
two additional portfolios. To test hypothesis H3, I form a ”Newcomers” portfolio consisting 
of stocks that are new additions to the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list. The 
country portfolios and the ”Newcomers” portfolio are also updated annually. Finally H4 and 
H5 are tested on a “List remainers” portfolio, which is formed out of the stocks that remain on 
the Interbrand list during the entire time period 2001-2009. I form the portfolio in 2001 and 
every year I eliminate list droppers. On the other hand no new brands are added to the 
portfolio. Thus, this is a hypothetical portfolio that a real investor could not form because it is 
impossible to know beforehand in year 2001 which brands stay on the ranking list for the 
entire nine year study period.   
4.2.2 Excess returns and benchmarks used 
 
I calculate the monthly excess returns over three different benchmarks. The first is the risk-
free return usually the US Treasury-bill rate or LIBOR rates. Hull (2006) argues that 
regulatory and tax issues cause the treasury rates to be artificially low, hence I use LIBOR 
rates. Also Huhtakangas (2009) uses LIBOR rates due to the same reason in his master’s 
thesis examining American and European “sin” stocks. I use the annualized 30 day LIBOR 
rates denominated in USD for the global, North America, ”Newcomers” and “List remainers” 
brand portfolios, the EUR rates for the Europe brand portfolio and JPY rates for the Asia 
portfolio.  
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The second benchmark is the market portfolio, which theoretically consists of the weighted 
sum of every asset in the market. In my study I use the MSCI World index for the 
global, ”Newcomers” and “List remainers” brand portfolios. The MSCI World index 
measures the stock returns of 24 developed countries, which cover the majority of the 
countries featured in the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands study. The MSCI World index 
captures 95% of the stock universe in these countries. For the North America portfolio, 
following Huhtakangas (2009), I use the Wilshire 5000 index to depict the market index in 
USA. Similarly, for the Europe brand portfolio, I use the MSCI Europe index, which consists 
of 16 developed European countries. For the Asia brand portfolio, I chose the MSCI Far East 
index, which includes 10 Asian countries. Regressions for the North America and Europe 
portfolios are run also using S&P 500 and Dow Jones Stoxx TMI indices, because these are 
popular benchmark indices for American and European stock market studies. The results 
found were very similar to those found in the original regressions. Hence, I conclude that 
Wilshire 5000 and MSCI Europe are suitable indices for benchmarking purposes.  
The third benchmark is an industry-matched portfolio formed by using the 30-industry 
classification of Fama and French (1997), which can be found from Ken French’s website. 
This is done to make sure that the abnormal returns are not due to the strong performance of 
some specific industry during the nine year study period. Even though the Fama and French 
industry portfolio is conducted of American stocks, assuming that stock markets around the 
world behave similarly, it acts as a benchmark also for the Europe and Asia portfolios. The 
industry portfolio is formed by first calculating how many brand owners fall into each 
industry group included in the 30-industry classification. The amounts of each industries 
presented are then used as portfolio weights when forming the industry portfolio from specific 
industry returns.  
4.3 Regression models used 
 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression driven Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
a frequently used method for portraying expected stock returns. However, the method has 
been criticized in finance literature due to its assumption for undiversifiable systematic risk 
(e.g. Black et al., 1972; Kon, 1978). In the CAPM, the beta, which measures the risk, is 
derived from the general equilibrium of portfolios that are formed on the mean-variance 
efficient frontier. This is contrary to the three and four factor models, which include factors 
that have been empirically found to be associated with stock returns. (Anginer et al., 2010.) In 
49 
 
my thesis I use both the CAPM and its extension, the Fama French three-factor model to test 
stock market efficiency and to ensure that abnormal returns are not caused by risk factors. In 
this subsection, I present these two models in more detail. 
4.3.1 The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
 
The CAPM determines the appropriate required rate of return E(Ri) for an asset to be added in 
a well-diversified portfolio with the following equation: 
                                                                (1) 
where:  
 Rf  is the risk-free rate 
     
           
   
                      (2) 
 where:  
Cov(Ri, Rm) is the covariance between portfolio return and market 
return 
σm
2
 is the standard deviation of the market return 
and                      
 Rm is the expected return of the market portfolio 
 
If the portfolio is able to create abnormal excess return, the equation gets an additional 
intercept term called the Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968), which is illustrated in the equation 
below: 
                                               (3) 
where: 
 α is the Jensen’s alpha 
A positive alpha signals excess return whereas a negative alpha means that the return fails to 
beat the benchmark return. 
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After calculating expected returns for each individual stock, the stocks are included in the 
brand portfolios by using the following equation: 
 (  )  ∑   
 
                             (4) 
where: 
 Rp is the return on the portfolio 
 Ri is the return on stock i and 
 wi is the weighting component of stock i (that is, the share of stock i in the portfolio) 
4.3.2 The Fama-French three factor model 
 
The following three factor model, which is an extension of the traditional CAPM, was created 
in 1992 in the research paper: “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns” by Fama and 
French. The equation presented below determines the return for the risky asset controlled by 
the size and value anomalies.  
                                                                  (5) 
where: 
     is the return on stock i in month t  
     is the risk-free rate 
 α is the Jensen’s alpha which captures the abnormal risk-adjusted return 
      is the return on the market portfolio in month t in excess of     
     is the return difference between small market cap and large market cap 
firms in month t  
     is the return difference between high book-to-market ratio firms and low 
book-to-market ratio firms in month t 
 
Multifactor models of CAPM such as the three and four factor models (e.g. Carhart, 1997) 
increase the explanatory power of the regression model because they assume that several 
factors affect the return. The idea of the three factor model stems from the historical fact that 
small firms and firms with a high book-to-market ratio tend to generate higher returns than 
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what the CAPM security market line (SML) predicts. Moreover, the value premium has been 
said to rise because the market undervalues distressed (value) stocks and overvalues growth 
stocks. As these pricing errors disappear, distressed (value) stocks earn higher returns than 
growth stocks. (Lakonishok et al., 1994.) Hence, the HML and SMB factors are considered as 
proxies for systematic, undiversifiable risk and therefore they reduce the alpha in the 
regression. If the betas of these factors are significant in the regression model, it can be 
concluded that the excess returns are mainly caused by these factors. In other words, if the 
coefficient for HML for instance is significantly positive, the stocks behave as value stocks. 
On the other hand if the alpha remains unchanged after introducing these two risk factors into 
the regression model, we can reason that true excess returns are generated due to some other 
factor than having many small firms or value firms in the portfolio.  
Fama-French factors are calculated as the difference between the average returns of the 
different firm types mentioned. For instance, publicly listed firms are divided into two groups 
based on whether their market capitalization is below the median market capitalization or 
exceeds it. The SMB factor is thus the average return of small firms minus that of large firms. 
The same procedure is performed for the HML factor except that firms are divided into three 
groups based on their B/M ratios. The return difference is hence the average return of the high 
B/M ratio group minus that of the low B/M ratio group.  
Since the Fama-French factors are readily available for the entire study period on Kenneth 
French’s website only for US data, I use them only for the North America portfolio. For the 
other portfolios, I form the HML and SMB factors manually from equity indices. This method 
has been used previously by Huhtakangas (2009) in his master’s thesis. Also Faff (2003) 
studies how Fama-French factors can be constructed from indices. For the 
global, ”Newcomers” and “List remainers” portfolios, I calculate the SMB factor as the 
difference between the monthly returns of the MSCI World Small Cap and MSCI World 
Large Cap indices. Respectively, I calculate the HML factor as the difference between the 
monthly returns of MSCI World Value and MSCI World Growth indices. Following this 
method, I form the factors for the Europe and Asia portfolios in the same way, but from 
MSCI Europe and MSCI Far East size and style indices. An alternative option would be to 
build the global and regional factors manually from Fama-French country specific factors, 
which do exist on the Kenneth French website. However, these country specific factors have 
not been updated since 2007. Thus, utilizing them would significantly shorten my study 
period.   
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It must be noted that Fama-French factors built with this method act only as proxies for the 
original factors and cannot thus be compared to them directly. The major difference to the 
original factors is that MSCI uses a different method to build its size and style indices than 
Fama and French. The MSCI large cap indices do not include the largest 50% of the stock 
universe and the small cap indices the smallest 50%. On the contrary, the large cap indices 
represent approximately the largest 70% of the whole stock universe included in the index 
while the small cap indices capture only the smallest 15% of the universe. (MSCI, 2011). 
When it comes to the HML factor, Fama and French divide the stocks into three groups, 
forming the value group from the highest third and the growth group from the smallest third. 
However, the MSCI value index includes 50% of the stocks and the corresponding growth 
index the other 50%. Hence, all stocks are placed in one of these two indices (MSCI, 2011).  
The expanded version of the Fama-French three-factor model, the four-factor model, also 
known as the Carhart (1997) model, is an alternative model often used to study risk-adjusted 
stock returns. This model includes a momentum factor, which measures the overall sentiment 
of the stock market and may therefore explain potential excess returns. However, this factor is 
only available for the US stock market and therefore the factor is excluded from my study.  
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5 Analysis and results 
 
Analysis and results section presents first descriptive statistics for the four core brand 
portfolios, the global, North-America, Europe and Asia portfolios. After which I discuss the 
univariate comparisons of the raw monthly brand portfolio returns and the monthly returns of 
the market index and the industry-matched benchmark portfolio. Then the regression results 
are analyzed in detail and finally robustness tests provide further support to the results.  
     
5.1 Descriptive characteristics 
 
In this section, I present descriptive summary characteristics for the four regional brand 
portfolios in Tables 3-6. Market value, brand value-to-market value ratio and market-to-book 
ratio are presented for each portfolio for financial years 2001 and 2009. Table 3 presents 
characteristics for the global brand portfolio. In general, the companies are large with a 
median market value of $34 billion in 2001 and $39 billion in 2009. On average, the brand 
value estimated by Interbrand represents a quarter of the market value of the company in both 
time periods. Market-to-book ratios are high, the medians being 3.9 and 2.9 in 2001 and 2009 
respectively. This is in line with studies stating that firms with a significant amount of 
intangible assets have high M/B ratios (see e.g. Simon et al., 1993, Lane et al., 1995 and 
Capraro et al., 1997).   
Table 3: Summary characteristics for the Global portfolio 
This Table presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for market value in US dollars, brand value-to-market value ratio and the market-to-book ratio for the 
Global brand portfolio. The summary characteristics are presented separately for year 2001 and 2009.  
 
# obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
2001       
Market Value ($ bn) 78 62 34 79 0.75 407 
Brand value / Mkt Value (%) 77 38 25 32 0.9 128 
Market / Book 75 6.7 3.9 9.6 0.8 69.1 
2009 
      Market Value ($ bn) 82 60 39 55 2.3 246 
Brand value / Mkt Value (%) 81 28 24 20 2.2 102 
Market / Book 78 3.6 2.9 3.1 0.5 16.0 
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Table 4 presents summary characteristics for the North America portfolio. The American 
sample companies are slightly larger than global brand owners in general with a median 
market value of $39 billion in 2001. In nine years the largest company loses 40% of its market 
value, though the median decreases only by $1 billion. Similarly as in the global brand 
portfolio, brand value represents 25% of the median market value. The median market-to-
book ratio is even higher for the North America portfolio, being 4.3 in 2001 and 3.4 in 2009.  
Table 4: Summary characteristics for North America portfolio 
This Table presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for market value in US dollars, brand value-to-market value ratio and the market-to-book ratio for the 
North America brand portfolio. The summary characteristics are presented separately for year 2001 and 2009.  
 
# obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
2001       
Market Value ($ bn) 51 72 39 90 2.5 407 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 51 45 25 34 1 128 
Market / Book 49 8.2 4.3 11.4 0.9 69.1 
2009 
      Market Value ($ bn) 49 62 38 59 2.3 246 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 49 29 26 18 2.5 99 
Market / Book 50 4.4 3.4 3.5 0.6 16.0 
 
Table 5 shows the same summary characteristics for the Europe portfolio. In 2001, European 
companies are on average smaller than the global companies in the full sample with a median 
market value of $29 billion. However, in 2009 the same figure rises to $45 billion, which is 
interestingly $7 billion more than in the North America portfolio. The increase in the median 
market value results firstly from smaller brands such as Benetton, Carlsberg and Swatch 
dropping from the ranking list after 2001 and secondly from the introduction of brands with 
very large market value such as HSBC. Furthermore, there are some brands whose market 
value has more than doubled from 2001 to 2009, for instance LVMH and Nestlé. This 
increase in market value translates into a smaller proportion of brand value, which decreases 
from 29% to 21% of market value from 2001 to 2009. The market-to-book ratios of European 
brand owners are lower than American brand owners; however they are still well above 1.0.    
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Table 5: Summary characteristics for Europe portfolio 
This Table presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for market value in US dollars, brand value-to-market value ratio and the market-to-book ratio for the 
Europe brand portfolio. The summary characteristics are presented separately for year 2001 and 2009.  
 
# obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
2001       
Market Value ($ bn) 20 45 29 54 2.4 192 
Brand value/Mkt Value (%) 20 35 29 29 1.8 103 
Market / Book 20 4.3 3.2 3.5 0.8 14.9 
2009 
      Market Value ($ bn) 26 55 45 52 3.8 191 
Brand value/Mkt Value (%) 26 27 21 26 2.6 202 
Market / Book 24 2.7 1.9 2.1 0.5 8.4 
 
Finally, Table 6 presents summary characteristics for the Asia portfolio. Asian brand owner 
companies are smaller than American and European companies measured by median market 
value ($29 billion in 2001 and $36 billion in 2009). The brand value/market value ratio is also 
lower for Asian brands totaling 21% and 17% in 2001 and 2009, respectively. Also market-to-
book ratios for Asian brand owners are lower than those of European and American 
companies. The ratio is only 1.2 in 2009, which is rather low for companies with large 
amounts of intangible assets. 
Table 6: Summary characteristics for Asia portfolio 
This Table presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for market value in US dollars, brand value-to-market value ratio and the market-to-book ratio for the 
Asia brand portfolio. The summary characteristics are presented separately for year 2001 and 2009.  
 
# obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
2001       
Market Value ($ bn) 6 43 29 34 22 111 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 6 27 21 15 13 53 
Market / Book 6 2.6 2.5 0.9 1.9 3.5 
2009 
      Market Value ($ bn) 7 57 36 42 19 140 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 7 22 17 9 13 39 
Market / Book 7 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.7 2.9 
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5.2 Univariate analysis 
 
In this subsection I discuss the historical stock market performance of the four brand 
portfolios. Table 7 shows the plain annualized average monthly returns from the time period 
August 2001 – October 2010 for the four brand portfolios. In addition, returns excess of the 
three different benchmarks used are presented. Furthermore, returns are shown separately for 
the three different weighting methods for each portfolio. These results provide an initial 
overview of how brand stocks have performed historically and whether the hypotheses tested 
can be accepted. Afterwards, the results are tested statistically with regression analysis to find 
out whether they are significant.  
Table 7 below shows that the four portfolios yield a positive average return during the nine 
year study period ranging from 6.07% to 10.21% annually depending on the portfolio and the 
weighting method. All four portfolios yield positive returns also excess of the risk-free rate. 
The Global and North America portfolios succeed in beating also the market index and the 
industry benchmark by at least 0.42 percentage points. On the contrary, Europe and Asia 
portfolios lose to the market portfolio regardless of the portfolio weighting method by as 
much as 4.06 percentage points. However, these two portfolios beat the industry portfolio by 
as much as 1.50 percentage points, which is most likely due to the fact that the industry 
portfolio is formed solely out of American stocks and hence is not totally comparable to the 
performance of European and Asian stocks.  
The Global and the three regional portfolios perform rather equally if we ignore the excess 
returns over the market portfolio. Moreover, the returns measured by market value- and equal-
weighting methods are very similar. On the other hand when brand values are as used as 
portfolio weights, the returns are clearly smaller in the case of all four portfolios compared to 
the market value- and equal-weighted returns. Thus, it seems like the owners of the most 
valuable brands (companies with highest brand values) do not outperform owners of less 
valuable brands. In addition, this may be a sign that the stock market does not value brand 
owners based on the numeric brand values defined by brand consultancies.    
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Table 7: Annualized returns of the brand portfolios: 2001-2010 
This table presents average annualized monthly returns for the Global, North America, Europe and Asia 
portfolios. Returns are presented separately for the market value-weighted, equal-weighted and brand value-
weighted portfolios. Excess returns are calculated over the risk-free rate, the market index and an industry-
matched benchmark index. The risk-free rate used is the annualized monthly LIBOR rate in either USD, EUR or 
JPY. The market index is either MSCI World Index, Wilshire 5000 Index, MSCI Europe Index or MSCI Far-
East Index. T-statistics are in parentheses for the comparisons between the brand portfolios and the benchmarks. 
Brand portfolio 
Portfolio 
return (%) 
Excess return 
over risk-free 
rate (%) 
Excess return 
over mkt 
portfolio (%) 
Excess return 
over industry 
benchmark (%) 
Global      
Mkt value weight 9.55 
6.97 
(1.2492)* 
2.41 
(0.3056) 
4.85 
(0.5691) 
Equal weight 10.10 
7.49 
(1.1432) 
2.91 
(0.3389) 
5.36 
(0.5834) 
Brand value weight 7.44 
4.90 
(0.7728) 
0.42 
(0.0506) 
2.82 
(0.3139) 
North America     
Mkt value weight 9.05 
6.47 
(1.0834) 
5.85 
(0.7205) 
4.36 
(0.4975) 
Equal weight 10.21 
7.61 
(1.1208) 
6.98 
(0.7976) 
5.48 
(0.5855) 
Brand value weight 7.52 
4.98 
(0.7690) 
4.36 
(0.5152) 
2.89 
(0.3187) 
Europe     
Mkt value weight 9.19 
6.53 
(1.1234) 
-1.34 
(-0.1548) 
4.49 
(0.5184) 
Equal weight 9.09 
6.43 
(0.8882) 
-1.44 
(-0.1491) 
4.40 
(0.4549) 
Brand value weight 7.17 
4.56 
(0.5878) 
-3.18 
(-0.3188) 
2.56 
(0.2555) 
Asia     
Mkt value weight 9.03 
6.38 
(0.8944) 
-1.35 
(-0.1504) 
4.35 
(0.4536) 
Equal value weight 8.89 
6.25 
(0.8316) 
-1.48 
(-0.1598) 
4.21 
(0.4272) 
Brand value weight 6.07 
3.48 
(0.4813) 
-4.06 
(-0.4503) 
1.50 
(0.1560) 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% 
level 
 
Below, Figure 4 illustrates the development of one US dollar invested either in the Global 
brand portfolio, the MSCI World index or the risk-free rate during the time period August 
2001-October 2010. The return for the Global brand portfolio is calculated with the market 
value-weighting method because that is the most common portfolio weighting method used. 
Figure 4 shows that the Global brand portfolio and the MSCI World index perform nearly 
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hand-in-hand until the economic crisis, which started in the fall of 2008. After this, the Global 
brand portfolio stretches to a clear lead. All in all, the one dollar investment in the Global 
brand portfolio materializes into 2.0 dollars during nine years. On the contrary, one dollar 
invested in the MSCI World index grows into 1.6 dollars during the same time period. This 
translates into a 25% difference to the advantage of the Global brand portfolio. 
Figure 4: Monthly market value-weighted returns comparison for the Global brand portfolio 
This Figure demonstrates the development during August 2001 and October 2010 of a $1 investment made to the 
Global brand portfolio, the MSCI World Index and the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate is the USD denominated 
30 day LIBOR rate. 
 
5.3 Regression analysis results 
 
Tables 8-10 present the results for the core regressions. I test all four brand portfolios with 
three separate regressions, each using one of the three weighting methods. I calculate the 
excess returns over the risk-free rate, which is in this case the monthly LIBOR rate 
denominated in USD for the Global and North America portfolios, EUR for the Europe 
portfolio and JPY for the Asia portfolio. I run the regressions for each brand portfolio first 
with the simple CAPM model, after which I introduce the Fama-French factors to the 
regressions. The time period is August 2001-October 2010, which results in altogether 108 
monthly portfolio returns. In the following three subsections, I discuss the regression results 
separately for the three different portfolio weighting methods. 
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5.3.1 Regression analysis results for market value-weighted portfolios  
 
In this subsection, I evaluate the regression results for the market value-weighted portfolios. 
Table 8 presents the simple CAPM and Fama-French three factor regression results for the 
Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolios. I also compare the risk-adjusted results of 
the North America portfolio to earlier studies, since previous literature about American 
brands exists. 
In the simple CAPM regression, the market value-weighted Global portfolio yields a 0.24% 
excess monthly (2.92% annualized) return over the risk-free rate, but the alpha is not 
significant. The highly significant market beta is 0.89, which is close to 1.0, signaling a rather 
high correlation with the market index. The adjusted R square equals approximately 87%, 
which indicates that the regression has high explanatory power.  
In the risk-adjusted regressions, the alpha increases to 0.40% (4.89% annualized) and 
becomes significant at the 95% confidence level. The highly significant market beta increases 
as well to 0.93 and is hence even closer to 1.0 than in the simple CAPM regressions. The 
SMB factor is negative and highly significant. This indicates that global brand owners tend to 
behave as large companies’ stocks. Moreover, the HML factor is negative and significant at 
the 95% level. Thus, we can conclude that global brand stocks tend to behave also as growth 
stocks. Since the betas for the SMB and HML factors are significant, we can argue that the 
excess returns are not caused by intangible brand value per se. Furthermore, the adjusted R 
square is approximately 87%. Hence, the market index and SMB and HML factors seem to 
explain the excess returns created by brand stocks relatively well. Thus, at this stage, H1 is 
accepted for the Global brand portfolio when using the market value-weighting method, since 
the risk-adjusted alpha is significantly positive.  
The alpha for the North America portfolio is 0.47% (5.84% annualized) in the simple CAPM 
regression and 0.54% (6.73% annualized) in the three factor model. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The alphas are well in line with Madden 
et al.’s (2006) result of 0.57%. The market betas in both models are highly significant on a 99% 
level and very close to 1.0. Hence, they are slightly higher than the 0.85 beta found in the 
Madden et al. (2006) study.  
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Table 8: Regression results for the market value-weighted Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolios 
Monthly CAPM and Fama-French three factor regressions of the market value-weighted Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolio returns on the MKT, SMB and 
HML factors during August 2001 - October 2010. The dependent variable is the brand portfolio return less the risk-free rate. The alpha is the excess return, MKT is the 
market premium, SMB is the monthly return difference between small and big companies as percentage points and HML is the monthly return difference between companies 
with high book-to-market value and low book-to-market value as percentage points. The risk-free rate is either the USD, EUR or JPY denominated LIBOR rate and the 
market index is either MSCI World Index, Wilshire 5000 Index, MSCI Europe Index or MSCI Far-East Index. T-statistics are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 describes the 
explanatory power of the model. The two last rows of the table present the annualized alpha and the number of observations. 
 *: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level
Market value-weighted 
  Global North America Europe Asia 
  CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor 
α 0.0024 0.0040 0.0047 0.0054 0.0012 0.0013 0.0003 0.0009 
  (1.3424) (2.3448)** (3.0684)*** (3.5559)*** (0.3717) (0.4220) (0.0677) (0.1884) 
βMKT 0.8851 0.9297 1.0228 1.0424 0.6445 0.6661 0.7721 0.7855 
  (24.0302)*** (25.8164)*** (30.7663)*** (27.0502)*** (12.0667)*** (10.5115)*** (8.7460)*** (8.8915)*** 
βSMB   -0.2871   -0.1648   -0.0604   -0.3743 
    (-3.6940)***   (-2.8396)***   (-0.4984)   (-1.6749)* 
βHML   -0.2361   0.0592   -0.0710   0.1312 
    (-2.5224)**   (1.2500)   (-0.4147)   (0.4916) 
Adj R
2
 0.8434 0.8663 0.8983 0.9046 0.5747 0.5684 0.4136 0.4186 
Annualized alpha 2.92% 4.89% 5.84% 6.73%  1.39% 1.62%  0.36% 1.05%  
# obs 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
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The SMB factor is -0.16 and statistically significant, which indicates that North American 
brand owners, like global brand owners, are large firms. This result is in line with previous 
results, though Madden et al. (2006) show a more negative SMB factor of -0.36. The HML 
factor on the other hand is slightly positive 0.059. However, the coefficient lacks significance.  
On the contrary, Madden et al. (2006) find a negative -0.36 HML coefficient for the market 
value-weighted portfolio. They conclude that American brand stocks have low book-to-
market ratios because due to accounting conventions, the brand values are only reflected in 
the market value, but not in the book value. My results are contradicting with theirs because 
the positive HML factor signals that American brand stocks have high B/M ratios, which 
again implies that American brand owners are value companies. The explanatory power of 
both models is even higher for the North America portfolio than in the case of the Global 
portfolio.  
Thus, H1 is accepted for the North America portfolio, since the alphas are positive and highly 
significant. All in all, the results for the North America portfolio are rather similar to the 
results of the Global portfolio, except that the HML factors have opposite signs. However, we 
should keep in mind that the Fama-French factors used for these two portfolios are not the 
same, hence we cannot compare the results directly.         
For the Europe portfolio, the simple CAPM alpha is 0.12% (1.39% annualized) while it 
increases to 0.13% (1.62% annualized) when the risk factors are added. However, both of the 
alphas are statistically insignificant. The market betas are 0.64 (CAPM) and 0.67 (three factor) 
and they are again highly significant in both models. However, the coefficients are clearly 
lower than in the case of the Global and North America portfolios indicating that the Europe 
portfolio correlates less with the market index than global and North American brand owners.  
The SMB factor is slightly negative, which indicates that unlike global and North American 
brands, European brand owners are not necessarily large companies, since the factor is not 
strongly negative. However, the SMB factor is insignificant, which means that it is not 
meaningful to draw strong conclusions on whether European brand owners behave like large 
or small stocks. The HML factor is also negative and insignificant. Thus, it is difficult to state 
definitely whether European brand stocks are value or growth companies. The negative factor 
suggests that European brand owners tend to behave as growth companies. The adjusted R 
squares in both models are significantly lower for the Europe portfolio than for the Global and 
North America portfolios. This weaker explanatory power of the regressions may be due to 
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the smaller sample size of the Europe portfolio. In the case of the Europe portfolio, H1 cannot 
be accepted because the alphas lack significance and they are only slightly positive.     
For the Asia portfolio the alphas are even smaller than in the case of the Europe portfolio, 
receiving values of 0.03% (0.36% annualized) and 0.09 (1.05% annualized) in the simple 
CAPM and three factor model respectively. Furthermore, the alphas are statistically 
insignificant. The Asia portfolio correlates moderately with the Asian market index, the 
market betas being highly significant and 0.78 in both models. 
The SMB factor is strongly negative and statistically significant at the 90% level. Thus, it 
appears that Asian brand stocks are clearly large companies. This makes sense, since Toyota, 
Samsung, Canon and Sony to mention a few are all large companies even on global standards. 
The HML factor on the other hand is clearly positive, though it lacks significance. However, 
this indicates that Asian brand owners are value companies with high B/M ratios. On the other 
hand as already mentioned previously in Section 5.1, Asian brand owners have lower market-
to-book ratios than American and European brand owners, though the ratios are above 1.0 on 
average. Hence, the positive HML factor is somewhat contradicting. The explanatory power 
is even weaker for the Asia portfolio than for the Europe portfolio, reaching only 41% in both 
models. This is probably due to the significantly smaller sample size of the Asia portfolio 
compared to the size of the global and other regional portfolios. Thus, similar to the Europe 
portfolio we cannot accept H1 due to the insignificance and minor alphas received in both 
regressions. 
To conclude, after analyzing the regression results for the market value-weighted portfolios, 
H1 is accepted for the Global and North America portfolios and rejected for the Europe and 
Asia portfolios. Thus, it seems at this stage that brand stocks behave differently in Europe and 
Asia than what has been previously discovered for American stocks. To gain a deeper 
understanding of the performance of the brand portfolios, I next calculate the portfolio returns 
with the equal-weighting method. In the following subsection I discuss the regression results 
for these portfolios.   
 
   
63 
 
5.3.2 Regression analysis results for equal-weighted portfolios 
 
Table 9 presents regression results for the equal-weighted portfolios. The equal-weighted 
Global portfolio generates lower alphas than the market value-weighted portfolio. The simple 
CAPM alpha equals 0.21% (2.66% annualized) and the three factor model generates a slightly 
higher alpha of 0.23% (2.76% annualized). Both coefficients are however statistically 
insignificant while the three factor alpha of the market value-weighted portfolio was 
significant. The highly significant market betas in both models are 1.05, which is higher and 
closer to 1.0 than in the market value-weighted regressions. The SMB factor is very close to 
zero and insignificant, thus it is not meaningful to draw conclusions about the size of the 
companies. The HML factor is barely significant at the 90% level and the factor is similar to 
that generated by the market value-weighted portfolio. Thus, it seems again that global brand 
owners behave as growth stocks. The explanatory power of both models is again rather high 
at 87%. By the analysis of the equal-weighted regression results, I conclude that H1 cannot be 
accepted any more for the Global portfolio because the positive alphas lack significance in 
both models. 
The results for the North America portfolio are rather similar to those of the market value-
weighted portfolio. Alphas in both models are significant at the 99% level and receive values 
of 0.56% (6.88% annualized) and 0.47% (5.80% annualized) for the CAPM and three factor 
model respectively. The market beta is slightly higher at 1.16 in the CAPM regression 
compared to the beta of the three factor model, which is 1.07. Both betas are in line with the 
betas of the market value-weighted regressions. The SMB factor is slightly positive and 
insignificant while in the market value-weighted regression it was negative and statistically 
significant. Hence, there is no further proof that American brand stocks would be particularly 
large companies. On contrary, the HML factor is clearly positive and statistically significant 
at the 99% level. This result is again somewhat differing from the coefficient received in the 
market value-weighted regression, where the factor was only slightly positive and 
insignificant. However, it seems that American brand stocks tend to behave like value 
companies. This result continues to contradict with Madden et al.’s (2006) findings stating 
that American brand stocks would behave as growth stocks. However, Madden et al. (2006) 
did not use equal-weighting in their methodology, therefore the coefficients are not entirely 
comparable. The R squares are similar to those of the market value-weighted regressions, 
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namely, very high at approximately 90%. To conclude, H1 is still accepted for the North 
America portfolio because the alphas remain strongly positive and statistically significant.  
When portfolio returns are calculated by using the equal-weighting method for the Europe 
portfolio, the alphas decrease and turn negative. The simple CAPM alpha equals -0.02% (-
0.33% annualized) and the three factor alpha is a little bit more negative at -0.03% (-0.39% 
annualized). However, both coefficients lack significance. The market betas are both highly 
significant and approximately 0.85, which is clearly higher than in the market value-weighted 
regressions (0.65). Hence, the equal-weighted Europe portfolio correlates more with the 
market index than the market value-weighted. The SMB and HML factors are both close to 
zero and insignificant, thus they do not explain the returns in the case of the Europe portfolio. 
The explanatory power increases a little bit in relation to the market value-weighted 
regressions. However, it is still moderate at 65%. H1 remains naturally rejected due to the 
negative and insignificant alphas.         
The alphas for the Asia portfolio are again insignificant and rather close to zero, hence it is 
not reasonable to make any statements about their historical over or underperformance. The 
highly significant market betas increase to approximately 0.83 compared to 0.78 received in 
the market value-weighted regressions. The SMB factor is again strongly negative and 
significant at the 90% level, which further proves that Asian brand stocks’ returns correlate 
with those of large companies. The HML factor on the other hand lacks again significance 
and this time it is close to zero. This decreases the credibility of my previous conclusion 
concerning Asian brand stocks behaving like value companies. Thus, I conclude that it is not 
meaningful to draw any conclusions about whether Asian brand stocks are value or growth 
companies. In addition, the explanatory power of both models remains weak at only 43%.  
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Table 9: Regression results for the equal-weighted Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolios 
Monthly CAPM and Fama-French three factor regressions of the equal-weighted Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolio returns on the MKT, SMB and HML 
factors during August 2001 - October 2010. The dependent variable is the brand portfolio return less the risk-free rate. The alpha is the excess return, MKT is the market 
premium, SMB is the monthly return difference between small and big companies as percentage points and HML is the monthly return difference between companies with 
high book-to-market value and low book-to-market value as percentage points. The risk-free rate is either the USD, EUR or JPY denominated LIBOR rate and the market 
index is either MSCI World Index, Wilshire 5000 Index, MSCI Europe Index or MSCI Far-East Index. T-statistics are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 describes the explanatory 
power of the model. The two last rows of the table present the annualized alpha and the number of observations. 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level
Equal-weighted 
  Global North America Europe Asia 
  CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor 
α 0.0021 0.0023 0.0056 0.0047 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0010 
  (1.1565) (1.1688) (3.2039)*** (2.8619)*** (-0.0781) (-0.0888) (-0.0322) (0.2122) 
βMKT 1.0542 1.0538 1.1582 1.0679 0.8547 0.8553 0.8267 0.8388 
  (27.0293)*** (25.6102)*** (31.0014)*** (25.7808)*** (14.2250)*** (11.9728)*** (9.0061)*** (9.1435)*** 
βSMB   0.0083   0.0501   0.0071   -0.4117 
    (0.0929)   (0.8027)   (0.0518)   (-1.7745)* 
βHML   -0.1732   0.2146   -0.0113   0.0096 
    (-1.6187)*   (4.2175)***   (-0.0587)   (0.0347) 
Adj R
2
 0.8720 0.8728 0.8997 0.9139 0.6530 0.6463 0.4281 0.4344 
Annualized alpha 2.66% 2.76% 6.88% 5.80% -0.33% -0.39% -0.18% 1.23% 
# obs 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
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To conclude, the regression results for the equal-weighted portfolios do not differ largely 
from the market value-weighted results. The major difference is that the alphas for the Global 
portfolio lose their significance when returns are equal-weighted. Thus, I am obliged to reject 
H1, which was already initially accepted when the market value-weighted results were 
analyzed. Moreover, H1 is still accepted for North America portfolio and rejected for Europe 
and Asia portfolios. The value anomaly seems to explain at least part of the excess returns 
generated by the North America brand portfolio, though this was not evident in the case of the 
market value-weighted portfolio. Contrary to Edmans (2011), I find that alphas do not 
increase when equal weights are used as portfolio weights. Instead, the market value-weighted 
portfolios yield higher alphas nearly every time. In the following subsection I will analyze the 
regression results for the brand value-weighted portfolios.  
 
5.3.3 Regression analysis results for brand value-weighted portfolios 
 
Finally, to explore whether brand values affect monthly stock returns, I use brand values 
assigned by Interbrand as portfolio weights. This methodology has been employed previously 
by Madden et al. (2006), hence it is reasonable to follow their path. From these regression 
results I am able to state whether hypothesis number two can be accepted or rejected. To 
remind, H2 states that brand value-weighting should increase excess returns because stocks 
with the highest brand values are expected to outperform stocks with lower brand values. The 
expected higher returns of the stocks with the highest brand values are overweighed in the 
brand portfolios due to the brand value weighting method. Hence, the overall monthly returns 
of the portfolios are driven up by this procedure. However, as seen already in section 5.1, in 
the univariate analysis, I concluded that brand value-weighting does not enhance the excess 
returns, but quite the opposite, it decreases them. In Table 10, the regression results are 
presented for the brand value-weighted portfolios.  
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Table 10: Regression results for the brand value-weighted Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolios 
 Monthly CAPM and Fama-French three factor regressions of the brand value-weighted Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolio returns on the MKT, SMB and 
HML factors during August 2001 - October 2010. The dependent variable is the brand portfolio return less the risk-free rate. The alpha is the excess return, MKT is the 
market premium, SMB is the monthly return difference between small and big companies as percentage points and HML is the monthly return difference between companies 
with high book-to-market value and low book-to-market value as percentage points. The risk-free rate is either the USD, EUR or JPY denominated LIBOR rate and the 
market index is either MSCI World Index, Wilshire 5000 Index, MSCI Europe Index or MSCI Far-East Index. T-statistics are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 describes the 
explanatory power of the model. The two last rows of the table present the annualized alpha and the number of observations. 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level 
Brand value-weighted 
  Global North America Europe Asia 
  CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor 
α 0.0002 0.0011 0.0035 0.0035 -0.0019 -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0017 
  (0.1305) (0.6051) (2.1564)** (2.2001)*** (-0.4524) (-0.6127) (-0.4786) (-0.3520) 
βMKT 1.0291 1.0519 1.1187 1.0888 0.8726 0.8741 0.7998 0.8108 
  (26.4651)*** (26.5100)*** (31.9627)*** (26.8024)*** (12.2517)*** (10.3670)*** (8.8771)*** (8.9517)*** 
βSMB     -0.1409   -0.0805   0.1210   -0.3137 
    (-1.6460)   (-1.3165)   0.7494   (-1.3691) 
βHML   -0.2772   0.1379   -0.1403   0.0986 
    (-2.6876)***   (2.7633)***   (-0.6162)   (0.3605) 
Adj R
2
 0.8673 0.8766 0.9051 0.9107 0.5822 0.5778 0.4210 0.4205 
Annualized alpha 0.30% 1.37% 4.29% 4.34% -0.22% -3.10% -2.59% -1.98% 
# obs 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
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For the Global portfolio, the alpha in both models is positive, but clearly lower than when 
using other portfolio weighting methods. Both alphas also lack significance. The rest of the 
factors are rather similar to the ones received from previous regressions. Thus, there is no 
need to analyze them further. To conclude, I reject H2 for the Global portfolio, because the 
brand value-weighted portfolio performs worse than the market value- and equal-weighted 
portfolios and moreover the positive annualized alphas ranging 0.81% - 1.37% are 
insignificant.     
In the case of the North America portfolio, the monthly alpha of 0.35% (same in both models) 
falls clearly short of the equivalent 1.32% monthly alpha obtained by Madden et al. (2006). 
The highly significant market betas are somewhat higher than in the previous regressions 
indicating that the brand value-weighting causes the portfolio to be more volatile than the 
stock market in general. The SMB factor is insignificant and slightly negative, which is in line 
with the coefficient received in the market value-weighted regression. The HML factor on the 
other hand is 0.21 and significant at the 99% level. This provides further evidence that 
American brand stocks tend to be classified as value stocks. Interestingly Madden et al. (2006) 
find a -0.09 HML factor in their study, which is completely opposite to my finding. On the 
other hand, the time period in my study is different from theirs. Hence, it is possible that the 
difference in the sign has changed over time. H2 is rejected also in this case, because the 
brand value-weighting does not enhance the outperformance, but on the contrary, weakens 
excess returns. 
The alphas of the Europe portfolio become even more negative when the portfolio is weighted 
with brand values. The three factor alpha is as low as -0.26% (-3.10% annualized). However, 
the alphas remain insignificant like before. The rest of the factors are in line with previous 
regression results, hence no new information is emerged from the brand value-weighted 
regression. Following the results obtained for the Global and North America portfolios, I 
reject H2 because using brand values as portfolio weights deteriorates the portfolio returns 
instead of enhancing them. 
Finally, also for the Asia portfolio alphas decrease compared to the alphas measured for the 
market value- and equal-weighted portfolios. Similar to the other regional portfolios, the rest 
of the coefficients do not differ largely from the other regressions. All in all, I reject H2 also 
for the Asia portfolio. Unfortunately only the North America portfolio’s brand value-weighted 
regression results are fully comparable to the Madden et al. (2006) research results because 
69 
 
they study only American stocks. Furthermore, similar studies for global, European or Asian 
stocks do not exist. 
Altogether, I reject H2 for all four brand portfolios because in every case the brand value-
weighted regressions generate weaker alphas compared to the market value- and equal-
weighted regressions. This result is contrary to the findings of Madden et al. (2006) 
concerning their American brand portfolio. It seems that brand stocks with the largest brand 
values do not outperform stocks with lower brand values. However, I do not compare directly 
returns of stocks with high brand values to returns of stocks with low brand values. Hence, it 
is not certain that this is the true case. Furthermore, if brand value credibly measures the 
financial value of intangible assets (brands in this case), and if brand equity models by Aaker 
(1995) and Srivastava et al. (1998) hold, meaning that brands create tangible financial 
benefits to the firm, companies with more valuable brand assets should be seen as better 
investment cases than companies with less valuable assets. Thus, it seems that the stock 
market does not distinguish the specific numeric brand value estimates assigned by an 
independent brand consultancy. On the contrary, the stock market treats publicly listed brand 
owners included in a brand ranking list as equal or values them based on some other factors. 
This argument is also against previous brand relevance research results, which state that the 
stock market does incorporate brand values and hence numeric brand values assigned by 
consultancies are relevant and accurate (see e.g. Kerin et al., 1998 and Barth et al., 1998a).  
Finally, to further analyze the data sample, I conduct some robustness tests. I form two 
additional brand portfolios and a winsorized portfolio. I present the results for the robustness 
tests in the following subsection.  
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6 Robustness tests  
 
The preceding subsection showed that only the North America brand portfolio is able to beat 
its benchmark and create genuine excess returns. In this subsection, I conduct robustness tests 
to further analyze the sample. I form two new portfolios, the “List remainers” portfolio and 
the ”Newcomers” portfolio. The former is a hypothetical portfolio demonstrating an 
investment case where the portfolio is formed based on the 2001 list and each year only brand 
owners that remain on next year’s list are left in the portfolio. In other words, drop-outs are 
eliminated from the portfolio each year. The “Newcomers” on the other hand are brand 
owners that are making a début on the list each year. Therefore, each year the portfolio 
consists of different stocks. The analysis of these two portfolios will elaborate on hypotheses 
H3, H4 and H5. Furthermore, I form a winsorized portfolio of the North America portfolio 
where I eliminate the three best and worst performing stocks during the nine year time period 
from the portfolio. This is done primarily because there is a strong suspicion, that a few well-
performing stocks might influence the overall performance of the portfolio too much. 
Secondly, also Edmans (2011) uses winsorization in his study to certify that excess returns 
truly exist. In the following subsection, I present the descriptive statistics, univariate and 
regression analysis results for the “Newcomers” and the “List remainers” portfolios.    
    
6.1 Analysis of additional portfolios 
 
This subsection presents the summary descriptive statistics for the two additional portfolios, 
the univariate analysis results and finally I discuss the regression results. 
 
6.1.1 Descriptive statistics for additional portfolios 
 
Table 11 presents summary characteristics for the ”Newcomers” portfolio. This portfolio 
consists of companies that each year are new on Interbrand’s Global Top 100 Brands ranking 
list. The starting year for the summary characteristics is year 2002 instead of 2001 because 
newcomers are calculated from the second ranking list, not from the first one where all list 
members can be considered as newcomers. The figures for 2002 and 2009 differ significantly 
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from each other. In 2002, newcomers are large companies with a median market value of $48 
billion, where as in 2009 the respective figure is only $4.2 billion. This can be explained by 
the fact that 2002 newcomers include large companies such as Johnson & Johnson, JP 
Morgan, Morgan Stanley and L’Oréal. On the other hand 2009 newcomers are smaller 
companies, for example Burberry and Campbell Soup Company. The brand value/market 
value ratio is also significantly smaller in 2002 (only 14%) than in 2009 (44%) for the same 
reason. The median market-to-book ratio is very high (5.2) in 2002, while in 2009 it is only 
2.6, which is in line with the ratio of the Global brand portfolio. The high ratio of 2002 is 
driven up by Accenture, which has an M/B ratio of 29.4. 
Table 11: Summary characteristics for ”Newcomers” portfolio 
This Table presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for market value in US dollars, brand value-to-market value ratio and the market-to-book ratio for the 
“Newcomers” brand portfolio. The summary characteristics are presented separately for year 2002 and 2009. 
Characteristics are presented for year 2002 instead of year 2001 because newcomers are defined starting from 
year 2002.   
 
# obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
2002       
Market Value ($ bn) 8 50 48 49 7.1 161 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 8 18 14 19 1.6 62 
Market / Book 8 7.8 5.2 9.2 1.2 29.4 
2009 
      Market Value ($ bn) 5 7.7 4.2 6.3 2.3 17 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 5 49 44 31 23 99 
Market / Book 5 4.7 2.6 4.3 2.3 12.3 
 
The “List remainers” portfolio consists of 53 companies that stay on the Interbrand Global 
Top 100 Brands ranking list for the entire study period of nine years. Table 12 shows that the 
median market value increases by 20% in nine years from $34 billion in 2001 to $41 billion in 
2009. The median proportion of brand value out of market value is higher in this portfolio 
than in the other portfolios, centering around 35% in 2001 and 27% in 2009. This is natural 
because brands that stay on the list for several years can be seen as the most powerful and 
strongest brands and hence have a larger brand value. The market-to-book ratio is also high 
for the “List remainers” portfolio decreasing from 4.1 in 2001 to 2.9 in 2009. Next, I will 
present the univariate analysis of these two additional portfolios.    
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Table 12: Summary characteristics for "List remainers” portfolio 
This Table presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for market value in US dollars, brand value-to-market value ratio and the market-to-book ratio for the 
“List remainers” brand portfolio. The summary characteristics are presented separately for year 2001 and 2009. 
 
# obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
2001       
Market Value ($ bn) 53 61 34 80 3 407 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 53 45 35 34 1.8 133 
Market / Book  50 7.9 4.1 11.4 0.8 69.1 
2009 
      Market Value ($ bn) 53 61 41 54 4.9 246 
Brand value/ Mkt Value (%) 53 30 27 18 2.6 99 
Market / Book 49 3.9 2.9 3.3 0.6 16.0 
 
6.1.2 Univariate analysis for additional portfolios 
 
Table 13 presents the univariate return comparisons for the two additional portfolios. 
The ”Newcomers” and “List remainers” portfolios generate positive returns measured excess 
of the risk-free rate, the market index and the industry-matched portfolio. They also 
outperform the other four brand portfolios despite of the portfolio weighting method used. 
Just like in the case of the Global, North America, Europe and Asia portfolios, the brand 
value-weighting seems to deteriorate the outperformance for the “List remainers” portfolio. 
However, for the “Newcomers” portfolio the effect is exactly the opposite, which suggests 
that H2 could finally be accepted. The univariate analysis implies that also H3 and H4 could 
be accepted. However, monthly portfolio returns have to be analyzed also statistically to be 
able to draw such conclusions.    
Figure 5 on the other hand illustrates the historical performance of these two portfolios in 
relation to the Global brand portfolio during the time period August 2002 – October 2010. All 
three portfolios develop hand in hand until year 2005, after which “Newcomers” portfolio 
seems to become more volatile. A person who had invested one US dollar into the “List 
remainers” portfolio in August 2002 would have $2.6 in October 2010 while the one dollar 
investment transforms into $2.4 in the Global brand portfolio and into $2.2 in the 
“Newcomers” portfolio. However, the “List remainers” portfolio is a hypothetical portfolio, 
which cannot be replicated in real life because it is impossible to know beforehand which 
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brands stay on the ranking list for the whole nine year period. Therefore this comparison is 
not realistic, but only a hypothetical portrayal of the performance of different kinds of brand 
portfolios. Next, I will move on to the actual regression analysis of these two additional 
portfolios.   
Table 13: Annualized returns of the additional portfolios: 2001-2010 
This table presents average annualized monthly returns for the ”Newcomers” and the “List remainers” portfolios. 
Returns are presented separately for the market value-weighted, equal-weighted and brand value-weighted 
portfolios. Excess returns are calculated over the risk-free rate, the market index and an industry-matched 
benchmark index. The risk-free rate used is the annualized monthly LIBOR rate in USD and the market index is 
the Wilshire 5000 Index. T-statistics are in parentheses for the comparisons between the brand portfolios and the 
benchmarks. 
Brand portfolio 
Portfolio 
return (%) 
Excess return 
over risk-free 
rate (%) 
Excess return 
over mkt 
portfolio (%) 
Excess return 
over industry 
benchmark (%) 
“Newcomers”     
Mkt Value Weight 12.55 
9.89 
(1.2163) 
1.74 
(0.1770) 
5.20 
(0.5008) 
Equal Value Weight 12.82 
10.14 
(1.2749)* 
1.98 
(0.2038) 
5.44 
(0.5308) 
Brand Value Weight 13.41 
10.72 
(1.3946)* 
2.52 
(0.2651) 
6.00 
(0.5962) 
”List remainers”     
Mkt Value Weight 10.70 
8.09 
(1.3553)* 
3.49 
(0.4267) 
5.95 
(0.6761) 
Equal Value Weight 10.59 
7.98 
(1.2024) 
3.38 
(0.3908) 
5.84 
(0.6312) 
Brand Value Weight 7.52 
4.98 
(0.7739) 
0.50 
(0.0590) 
2.90 
(0.3200) 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% 
level 
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Figure 5: Monthly market value-weighted returns comparison for the "Newcomers", "List remainers" 
and Global brand portfolios 
This Figure demonstrates the development during August 2002 and October 2010 of a $1 investment made to the 
Global brand portfolio, the “Newcomers” portfolio and the “List remainers” portfolio.  
 
6.1.3 Regression analysis for additional portfolios 
 
Table 14 presents the regression results for the ”Newcomers” and “List remainers” portfolios. 
Results for the three different portfolio weighting methods are all presented in the same table. 
For the ”Newcomers” portfolio alphas are positive in the case of all three weighting methods, 
ranging from 2.22% to 3.88% on annualized basis. However, they lack statistical significance. 
The ”Newcomers” portfolio generates similar returns compared to the Global portfolio, 
except in the case of the brand value-weighted portfolio, where alphas exceed those of the 
Global portfolio clearly. An interesting aspect is that this is the only portfolio so far where the 
alphas are largest for the brand value-weighted portfolio compared to the other portfolios. 
Using brand values as portfolio weights increases the risk-adjusted annualized excess return 
by 0.34-1.57 percentage points depending whether compared to the market value- or equal-
weighted portfolio return. The reason explaining this might be that some of the newcomers 
have been assigned remarkably high brand values by Interbrand than newcomers on average 
and in addition have performed particularly well, driving up the portfolio return. Furthermore, 
the small sample size of the “Newcomers” portfolio causes the portfolio weight of each stock 
to differ greatly depending on which weighting method is used. The difference is clearest 
when comparing equal weights to brand value weights.  
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Table 14: Regression results for the ”Newcomers” and “List remainers” portfolios 
Monthly regressions of the market value-, equal- and brand value-weighted “List remainers” and ”Newcomers” 
portfolio returns on the MKT, SMB and HML factors. The time period is August 2001 - October 2010 for the 
“List remainers” portfolio and August 2002 – October 2010 for the ”Newcomers” portfolio. The dependent 
variable is the brand portfolio return less the risk-free rate. The alpha is the excess return, MKT is the market 
premium, SMB is the monthly return difference between small and big companies as percentage points and 
HML is the monthly return difference between companies with high book-to-market value and low book-to-
market value as percentage points. The risk-free rate is the USD denominated LIBOR rate and the market index 
is the MSCI World Index. T-statistics are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 describes the explanatory power of the 
model. The two last rows of the table present the annualized alpha and the number of observations. 
 
  "Newcomers" "List remainers" 
    CAPM 3 factor CAPM 3 factor 
M
a
rk
et
 v
a
lu
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
 
α 0.0025 0.0028 0.0032 0.0045 
  (0.4941) (0.5427) (1.4345) (2.1832)** 
βMKT 0.8306 0.7966 0.9106 0.9434 
  (7.8329)*** (6.9807)*** (19.9373)*** (21.5039)*** 
βSMB   0.0523   -0.1995 
    (0.2068)   (-2.1077)** 
βHML   0.4878   -0.5108 
    (1.4578)   (-4.4787)*** 
Adj R2 0.3885 0.3893 0.7875 0.8249 
Annualized alpha 3.08% 3.45%  3.89% 5.56%  
E
q
u
a
l-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
 
α 0.0021 0.0018 0.0026 0.0025 
  (0.4673) (0.3996) (1.2368) (1.2233) 
βMKT 0.9277 0.8907 1.0501 1.0415 
  (9.9759)*** (8.8592)*** (24.3703)*** (23.9390)*** 
βSMB   0.1488   0.0696 
    (0.6680)   (0.7413) 
βHML   0.2841   -0.3902 
    (0.9637)   (-3.4497)*** 
Adj R2 0.5091 0.5052 0.8471 0.8608 
Annualized alpha 2.55% 2.22% 3.15% 3.06% 
B
ra
n
d
 v
a
lu
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
 
α 0.0032 0.0031 0.0003 0.0009 
  (0.6849) (0.6498) (0.1384) (0.4868) 
βMKT 0.8273 0.8062 1.0392 1.0542 
  (8.5780)*** (7.6973)*** (25.7122)*** (25.7414)*** 
βSMB   0.0747     -0.0876 
    (0.3218)   (-0.9909) 
βHML   0.1911   -0.3461 
    (0.6221)   (-3.2505)*** 
Adj R2 0.4332 0.4237 0.8605 0.8721 
Annualized alpha 3.88% 3.79% 0.33% 1.14% 
  # obs 96 96 108 108 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level 
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Hence, I accept H2 for the first time because in the case of newcomers, using brand values as 
portfolio weights enhances the excess returns generated. Thus, when it comes to newcomers, 
the brand value determined by Interbrand seems to have a positive impact on the stock market 
performance of the brand owner. This result is consistent with the results of Madden et al. 
(2006), who find that brand value-weighting increases excess returns for American brands. 
However, the brand owners with particularly high brand values might outperform stocks with 
lower brand values due to some other reasons than brand or intangible asset related reasons. 
The SMB factor is positive in all three regressions, which is different from the other brand 
portfolios, which had a negative factor in almost every case. However, the coefficients are not 
significant and some of them are as small as 0.05. Thus, companies that are new on the list 
seem to behave as small companies. This is comprehensible because newcomers are more 
likely to be small growth companies that are still building their brand equity and global 
presence. Madden et al. (2006) did not study newcomers separately in their study, thus it is 
impossible to compare the result with previous results.     
The HML factor is strongly positive in all three regressions, however these factors too lack 
statistical significance. By looking at the HML factors it seems that newcomers would behave 
as value companies. On the other hand, the market-to-book ratios presented earlier in Table 
11 are very high especially in the beginning of the study period. This again indicates that 
investors believe these companies to have good growth expectations. It may be possible that 
both anomalies, the small company anomaly and the value company anomaly, would explain 
the excess returns generated by the ”Newcomers” portfolio. It is important to note however, 
that the sample size of the ”Newcomers” portfolio is small, less than ten firms per year, which 
decreases the credibility of the regression model. This weakness is also seen in the average 
adjusted R square values received for the regressions, which range from 39% to 51%.   
Thus, it is not reasonable to accept H3, because despite alphas are positive they lack 
significance. Thus, it is not certain that list inclusion automatically leads to superior stock 
performance. This conclusion is contrary to Edmans (2011), who finds that newcomers 
outperform the market. Moreover, he finds that socially responsible mutual funds do indeed 
increase their overweight of companies listed on the “America’s Best Places to Work” 
ranking list over time. However, their stock purchases of newcomers explain only 0.02% of 
the annual outperformance. He adds that the main reason why SRI funds’ purchase behavior 
fails to explain a larger portion of the outperformance is that there does not exist that many 
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SRI funds. Thus, their purchases have too little price impact. Furthermore, Edmans (2011) 
finds that institutional investors underweight companies on the ranking list. Thus, institutional 
ownership does not explain outperformance either. Finally, Edmans (2011) notes, that due to 
the small number of newcomers, it is unlikely to have statistically significant results, and 
thereby draw inferences.  
However, the reasons causing the indicated excess returns of newcomers in my study are 
uncertain. The positive alpha is not necessarily caused by the list inclusion per se or the 
increased demand for the stock following the inclusion. It may be caused by the “small firm” 
or “value firm” anomalies or by an additional variable that is omitted from the regression 
model. Whether brand mutual funds’ increased willingness to buy brand stocks new to the list 
is causing the excess returns of the ”Newcomers” portfolio is also uncertain. Furthermore, 
studying the purchases of these brand mutual funds or purchases of institutional investors is 
out of the scope of my thesis, but would be an interesting area for future research.  
Now, I will move on to the analysis of the “List remainers” portfolio. The “List remainers” 
portfolio on the other hand represents a portfolio of global brand stocks that possess the 
strongest brands that remain on the Interbrand’s Global Top 100 Brands ranking list trough 
out the years 2001-2009. The alphas in the regressions are positive in both models and for all 
three weighting methods, but unfortunately they mostly lack significance. When compared to 
the alphas of the Global brand portfolio, it seems as the “List remainers” portfolio beats the 
Global portfolio with at least 0.5 percentage points in the cases of the market value- and 
equal-weighted portfolios. On the other hand, the excess returns are somewhat equal for the 
brand value-weighted portfolios for the Global and “List remainers” portfolios.  
The SMB factors change clearly when the weighting method is changed ranging from -0.20 in 
the market value-weighted regression to 0.07 in the equal-weighted regression. However, only 
the former reaches statistical significance. Thus, we can conclude with a caution that 
extremely strong brand stocks remaining on the brand ranking list for a decade behave as 
large companies. This is easy to accept since the “List remainers” portfolio includes very 
large companies like General Electric, The Coca-Cola Company, IBM, Intel, Royal Dutch 
Shell, Microsoft and Citigroup for example. The HML factors are similar in all weighting 
method cases, ranging from -35% to -51%, and they are all statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. Therefore, I conclude that “List remainers” tend to correlate with growth 
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stocks. In addition, the adjusted R squares are rather high in all regressions, which indicates, 
that the models tend to explain the returns of the “List remainers” well. 
Even though the alphas are positive, H1 cannot be fully accepted for the “List remainers” 
because they lack statistical significance in most cases. Furthermore, H2 is rejected because 
the utilization of brand values as portfolio weights decreases the outperformance of the 
portfolio. H4 is as well rejected because the alpha of the “List remainers” portfolio exceeds 
the alpha of the Global brand portfolio when returns are calculated with market value- and 
equal-weighting. When portfolios are brand value-weighted, the alphas are somewhat equal. 
On the other hand, the t-test of sample means conducted between the monthly portfolio 
returns of the “List remainers” and the Global portfolio (shown in Appendix 2), reveals that 
average returns do not differ significantly. In any case, H4 is rejected because there is no 
evidence that the Global portfolio would outperform the “List remainers” either. This result 
contradicts with Edmans (2011) result who concludes that stocks remaining on the 
“America’s Best Places to Work” ranking list for the entire study period generate weaker 
returns than the annually updated portfolio because the stock market learns about the true 
value of intangible assets that the sample companies possess. In my study it seems like the 
stock market does not incorporate the intangible brand values even in the case of the world’s 
most powerful brands that have remained successful throughout decades.  However, the 
superior performance of the “List remainers” portfolio may be resulting from American 
brands that represent 57% of the portfolio.  
 
6.2 Longevity analysis  
 
To explore the longevity of excess returns, I run additional separate regressions for the years 
2001-2005 for the “List remainers” portfolio to test whether the drift disappears eventually. 
Even though I already rejected H1 earlier stating that due to lack of statistical significance the 
positive alphas are not a self-evident sign of outperformance, it is interesting to see how the 
alphas evolve during time. Also Edmans (2011) used this method in his study. The longevity 
analysis is conducted for the “List remainers” portfolio because this portfolio includes the 
strongest brands that have remained on the list for nearly a decade. Therefore, the stock 
market is expected to be well aware of their existence and brand strength.  
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Table 15 below shows that annualized alphas are very high and statistically significant during 
the first year, after which they begin to decrease. The diminution seems to continue for two to 
three years depending on which portfolio weighting method is used. In year 2004 the alpha 
exceeds the previous year’s alpha in the case of the market value-weighted portfolio. For the 
equal- and brand value-weighted portfolios the surpassing takes place in year 2005. Thus, 
there is no clear sign of excess returns disappearing eventually and becoming insignificant in 
year five. H5 is therefore rejected. This result is contradicting with Edmans’ (2011) findings. 
It seems that the stock market does not learn about the relevance of brands as intangible assets 
even though their quantified value is publicly communicated annually in numerous media. 
Hence, lack of information is not causing the excess returns.      
Table 15: Longevity analysis of “List remainers” 
Monthly three factor risk-adjusted regressions of the market value-, equal- and brand value-weighted “List 
remainers” portfolio returns run separately for the years 2001-2005. Alphas are presented in the annualized 
percentage format and t-statistics are in parentheses. The last row shows the number of observations. The MKT, 
SMB, HML and R2 variables are left out due to their similarity with previous regressions. 
  Weighting method 
Year  
Market 
value Equal 
Brand 
value 
2001 24.08 27.38 19.86 
  (2.8230)** (2.2774)** (2.7512)** 
2002 6.31 4.69 -1.86 
  (1.3007) (0.9810) (-0.3494) 
2003 0.89 3.43 -0.14 
  (0.1707) (0.3962) (-0.0281) 
2004 3.60 -0.40 -0.09 
  (0.8114) (-0.0921) (-0.0202) 
2005 3.15 1.81 -1.01 
  (0.5295) (0.3023) (-0.1487) 
# obs 12 12 12 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level 
 
6.3 Winsorization 
 
 
As I concluded in section 5.3, the North America portfolio is the only brand portfolio for 
which H1 is accepted. To ascertain that the excess returns are not driven by outliers, I run the 
regressions again for winsorized portfolios. Winsorization means that a certain percentage of 
the sample, usually 5% or 10%, is eliminated from the portfolio. In practice, the x% highest 
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and x% lowest returns exhibited over the time period, are left out of the sample. This ensures 
that the best and worst performing stocks do not drive the results to one way or the other. I 
winsorize the North America portfolio with 5%, which translates into 3 stocks out of the 51 
stocks included in the portfolio on average. Due to the small sample size, it is not meaningful 
to winsorize with 10%, since it would decrease the portfolio size too much. The three best 
performing stocks during the time period August 2001 – October 2010 are Apple (+2,920%), 
Amazon.com (+1,157%) and Research In Motion (+1,142%). The three worst performers are 
American International Group (-98%), Citigroup (-89%) and Eastman Kodak Company (-
88%). Hence these six firms are removed from the North America portfolio.  
Table 16 below presents the risk-adjusted returns for the winsorized portfolios for the three 
different weighting methods. Only the alpha, t-statistics, annualized alpha and number of 
observations are showed because the other variables do not differ from previous regressions. 
Despite of eliminating outliers, the alphas remain positive and statistically significant at least 
at the 95% confidence level for all specifications. The annualized excess returns range from 
4.0% to 6.3%, which are similar to the results generated by the original North America three 
factor regression. Thus, I confirm that H1 holds for the North America portfolio after 
controlling for outliers.            
Table 16: Risk-adjusted returns of winsorized North America portfolio 
Monthly three factor risk-adjusted regressions of the market value-, equal- and brand value-weighted winsorized 
North America portfolio returns for the time period August 2001 - October 2010. Alphas are presented in the 
annualized percentage format and t-statistics are in parentheses. The last row shows the number of observations. 
The MKT, SMB, HML and R2 variables are left out due to their similarity with the non-winsorized original 
North America portfolio regressions. 
  Weighting method 
  
Market 
value Equal 
Brand 
value 
α 0.0051 0.0034 0.0033 
  (3.3772)*** (2.5945)*** (2.0872)** 
annualized alpha 6.26% 4.14% 4.00% 
# obs 108 108 108 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This thesis examines the historical stock performance of global stocks included in the Global 
Top 100 Brands ranking list published by Interbrand consultancy during years 2001-2009. 
The study was inspired by the findings of Madden et al. (2006) in particular, who find that 
American brand stocks included in the Interbrand brand ranking list outperform the market 
index during 1994-2001. Furthermore, studies examining employee satisfaction and company 
admiration ranking list participants (Edmans, 2011 and Anginer et al., 2010) and their 
historical stock performance gave the idea to use a ranking list issued by an independent 
organization as the primary data source. In addition, prior research has focused only on 
American brands, which created the need to study also brands based in other regions. 
Furthermore, research on the relationship between marketing actions and financial 
consequences is limited. Thus, this thesis aims to test whether companies that have built 
strong brands are better investments than companies on average.  
In my thesis, I form six different brand portfolios out of the sample, which totals 78-85 brand 
owner stocks each year. The portfolios are updated annually according to the most recent 
Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list. I use three different portfolio weighting 
methods, market value-, equal- and brand value-weighting, to increase the robustness of the 
results. Brand value-weighting provides also the opportunity to test the relevance of the 
numeric brand values assigned by Interbrand. I gather the stock price, market value, corporate 
characteristic and interest rate data from Datastream database. The index data is retrieved 
from the MSCI website. The monthly portfolio returns for the time period August 2001-
October 2010 are analyzed using the CAPM and Fama-French three factor regression models. 
I summarize the core results and propose suggestions for future research in the following two 
subsections.  
 
7.1 Discussion of core findings 
 
 
I conclude that H1, stating that strong brand owner stocks outperform the market, is only 
accepted for the North America brand portfolio. The market value-weighted portfolio earns a 
monthly risk-adjusted excess return of 0.54% (6.73% on annualized basis) during the time 
period August 2001–October 2010. The alpha is statistically significant at the 99% level. The 
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result holds also for the equal- and brand value-weighting methods and when controlling for 
outliers. However, H1 is rejected for all the other five brand portfolios. In the case of the 
Europe and Asia portfolios, alphas are mostly negative or close to zero and insignificant, 
whereas the positive alphas of the Global, “Newcomers” and “List remainers” lack statistical 
significance. Thus, my thesis confirms the finding of Madden et al. (2006), who find that 
North American brand stocks outperform the market during years 1994-2001. On the contrary, 
I find opposite results for European and Asian brand stocks.  
To remind, H2 states that using brand values as portfolio weights enhances the excess return 
because superior stock performance of the most valuable brands is expected to drive up the 
brand portfolio return. This hypothesis is also rejected for all brand portfolios, except for the 
“Newcomers” portfolio, for which the alpha is largest when using brand value-weighting. The 
rejection of H2 in the case of the other portfolios is contradicting with Madden et al.’s (2006) 
result stating that brand value-weighting increases the alpha. This raises the question whether 
brand values assigned by Interbrand and other equivalent independent agencies are accurate 
and credible enough. Even though a number of prior studies confirm that brand values are 
relevant, it seems that the numeric brand value does not play a large role in investors’ minds. 
A brand owner firm is most likely seen as a brand stock no matter what its actual ranking or 
brand value is. Brands with exceptionally high brand value such as Coca-Cola (earns a 
cumulative return of +65% during August 2001-October 2010) are not necessarily better 
investments than brands with smaller brand values such as KFC and Pizza Hut (owner Yum! 
Brands earns a respective return of +346%). However, it is not surprising that the stock 
market overlooks the numeric brand values because the brand valuation methods used by 
independent agencies are not currently recognized by the International Accounting Standards 
and have been criticized by several researchers (see e.g. Aaker, 1995).   
H3 regarding the performance of the ”Newcomers” brand portfolio is also rejected due to the 
insignificance of the positive alphas. Madden et al. (2006) did not study newcomers 
separately, hence I cannot compare my result with prior research. Edmans (2011) on the other 
hand does study newcomers and finds that they outperform the market index, though the 
result lacks significance due to small sample size. My “Newcomers” portfolio suffers from 
the same limitation regarding sample size and therefore the insignificant alphas do not come 
as a surprise.    
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The “List remainers” portfolio specific hypotheses, H4 and H5 test whether the brands that 
remain on the Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands ranking list throughout the entire nine year 
study period beat the Global brand portfolio and whether the excess returns the portfolio 
generates disappear eventually. I find that the “List remainers” portfolio earns larger alphas 
than the Global portfolio, but the return difference between these two portfolios is not 
significant. Thus, H4 is rejected because the results indicate that “List remainers” outperforms 
the Global portfolio, not the other way around. The longevity analysis reveals that the drift 
does not disappear eventually, but on the contrary excess returns remain positive during the 
first five years. Hence, H5 is rejected as well, which conflicts with Edmans (2011) findings. 
Though excess returns are often statically insignificant, there is an indication that the stock 
market does not seem to assimilate publicly available brand related information very well.   
The reasons causing American brand stocks to perform better than European and Asian stocks 
are unclear. First of all, the sample sizes of the Europe and Asia portfolios are smaller 
compared to the North America portfolio, which can be seen as lower explanatory power of 
the regression models. It should be noted that brand stocks are not a homogeneous group, but 
operate in different industries and have differing business logics, which may cause them to be 
analyzed and valued differently by the market. The results also suggest that the market 
assimilates brands and the potential they hold better in Europe and Asia than in North 
America. Hence, in this case the Efficient Markets Hypothesis seems to hold better in Europe 
and Asia than in North America.  
My thesis does not provide indication that building brand equity would destroy shareholder 
value because brand stocks on average do not underperform the market index. However, 
unsuccessful brand management may have detrimental consequences. The worst performing 
brands stocks, such as Nokia, Kodak and AIG have failed at least partly because of 
unsuccessful brand management. They have failed in keeping their brands up-to-date in the 
turbulent business environment that companies have to face nowadays. The secret of a long-
lasting strong brand is the firm’s ability to renew and revitalize the brand according to current 
lifestyle trends in order to keep the brand fresh in the eyes of consumers and investors. 
Especially external brand communication embodies several risks because it is one of the most 
central ways to build and manage a brand. Thus managers should pay more attention to 
consumer behavior and socio-economic trends in general to better understand their constantly 
changing business environment. This notion is closely related to the concept of business 
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ecosystem, which states that organizations and individuals form a community together where 
they function alongside (Moore, 1996).     
 
7.2 Suggestions for further research 
 
This thesis suffers from a few limitations. First of all there is a possibility that excess returns 
generated are not related to brands, but instead are related to a variable not captured by the 
Fama-French three factor model. There is also an endogeneity problem. It is difficult to tell, 
which comes first, superior stock performance or strong brand image. Finally, the small 
sample size makes it challenging to achieve statistically credible results. One of the core 
outcomes of this thesis is the fact that brand stocks around the world behave differently. Thus, 
to get a better insight of the performance differences between geographical regions, it would 
be interesting to study what causes the excess returns of American brand stocks. 
Outperformance may be due to initial undervaluation of American brand stocks compared to 
benchmarks or it may be compensation for higher risk-bearing. The Fama-French three factor 
model suggests also that the value anomaly might be related to the outperformance of 
American brand stocks. Furthermore, brand stocks could be subject to substantial stock 
purchases made by brand mutual funds, individual investors or even institutions.     
In consequence, perhaps the most promising avenue for future research is the relationship 
between marketing actions and financial outcomes. For instance, does brand equity generate 
additional cash flows or does it directly influence investor behavior? In particular, it would be 
meaningful to examine investor behavior in detail. Some researchers (see e.g. Frieder et al., 
2005 and Aspara et al., 2010) have predicted that individual investors tend to use heuristics 
when making investment decisions meaning that they are willing to invest in a company’s 
stock beyond its expected financial returns and risk for example because the company 
produces products that they are familiar with. Thus, it would be interesting to study individual 
and institutional investors’ stock purchases separately to see whether one investor group 
overweighs brand stocks in their portfolio.  
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Appendix 1 
Interbrand Global Top 100 Brands 2009 (example of the ranking list used) 
Rank 
Previous 
Rank 
Brand Owner 
Country of 
Origin 
Sector 
Brand 
Value 
($m) 
Change 
in 
Brand 
Value 
1 1 Coca-Cola 
The Coca-
Cola 
Company 
United 
States 
Beverages 68,734 3 % 
2 2 Ibm Ibm 
United 
States 
Business 
Services 
60,211 2 % 
3 3 Microsoft Microsoft 
United 
States 
Computer 
Software 
56,647 -4 % 
4 4 Ge Ge 
United 
States 
Diversified 47,777 -10 % 
5 5 Nokia Nokia Finland Electronics 34,864 -3 % 
6 8 Mc Donald's Mc Donald's 
United 
States 
Restaurants 32,275 4 % 
7 10 Google Google 
United 
States 
Internet 
Services 
31,98 25 % 
8 6 Toyota Toyota Japan Automotive 31,33 -8 % 
9 7 Intel Intel 
United 
States 
Electronics 30,636 -2 % 
10 9 Disney Disney 
United 
States 
Media 28,447 -3 % 
11 12 Hp Hp 
United 
States 
Electronics 24,096 2 % 
12 11 
Mercedes-
Benz 
Daimler Germany Automotive 23,867 -7 % 
13 14 Gillette 
Procter & 
Gamble 
United 
States 
FMCG 22,841 4 % 
14 17 Cisco Cisco 
United 
States 
Business 
Services 
22,03 3 % 
15 13 Bmw Bmw Group Germany Automotive 21,671 -7 % 
16 16 Louis Vuitton Lvmh France Luxury 21,12 -2 % 
17 18 Marlboro Altria Group 
United 
States 
Tobacco 19,01 -11 % 
18 20 Honda Honda Japan Automotive 17,803 -7 % 
19 21 Samsung Samsung 
South 
Korea 
Electronics 17,518 -1 % 
20 24 Apple Apple 
United 
States 
Electronics 15,433 12 % 
21 22 H&M H&M Sweden Apparel 15,375 11 % 
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22 15 
American 
Express 
American 
Express 
United 
States 
Financial 
Services 
14,971 -32 % 
23 26 Pepsi Pepsico 
United 
States 
Beverages 13,706 3 % 
24 23 Oracle Oracle 
United 
States 
Business 
Services 
13,699 -1 % 
25 28 Nescafé Nestle Switzerland Beverages 13,317 2 % 
26 29 Nike Nike 
United 
States 
Sporting 
Goods 
13,179 4 % 
27 31 Sap Sap Germany 
Business 
Services 
12,106 -1 % 
28 35 Ikea Ikea Sweden 
Home 
Furnishings 
12,004 10 % 
29 25 Sony Sony Japan Electronics 11,953 -12 % 
30 33 Budweiser 
Anheuser-
Busch Inbev 
United 
States 
Alcohol 11,833 3 % 
31 30 Ups Ups 
United 
States 
Transportation 11,594 -8 % 
32 27 Hsbc Hsbc 
United 
Kingdom 
Financial 
Services 
10,51 -20 % 
33 36 Canon Canon Japan Electronics 10,441 -4 % 
34 39 Kellogg’S 
Kellogg 
Company 
United 
States 
FMCG 10,428 7 % 
35 32 Dell Dell 
United 
States 
Electronics 10,291 -12 % 
36 19 Citi Citigroup 
United 
States 
Financial 
Services 
10,254 -49 % 
37 37 Jp Morgan 
Jp Morgan 
Chase & Co 
United 
States 
Financial 
Services 
9,55 -11 % 
38 38 
Goldman 
Sachs 
Goldman 
Sachs 
United 
States 
Financial 
Services 
9,248 -10 % 
39 40 Nintendo Nintendo Japan Electronics 9,21 5 % 
40 44 
Thomson 
Reuters 
Media 
Thomson 
Reuters 
Media 
Canada Media 8,434 1 % 
41 45 Gucci Ppr Italy Luxury 8,182 -1 % 
42 43 Philips Philips Netherlands Electronics 8,121 -2 % 
43 58 Amazon.Com Amazon.Com 
United 
States 
Internet 
Services 
7,858 22 % 
44 51 L’Oréal L’Oréal France FMCG 7,748 3 % 
45 47 Accenture Accenture 
United 
States 
Business 
Services 
7,71 -3 % 
46 46 Ebay Ebay 
United 
States 
Internet 
Services 
7,35 -8 % 
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47 48 Siemens Siemens Germany Diversified 7,308 -8 % 
48 56 Heinz 
Heinz 
Company 
United 
States 
FMCG 7,244 9 % 
49 49 Ford 
Ford Motor 
Company 
United 
States 
Automotive 7,005 -11 % 
50 62 Zara 
Inditex 
Group 
Spain Apparel 6,789 14 % 
51 61 Wrigley 
Mars Inc 
(Family) 
United 
States 
FMCG 6,731 10 % 
52 57 Colgate Colgate 
United 
States 
FMCG 6,55 2 % 
53 55 Axa Axa France 
Financial 
Services 
6,525 -7 % 
54 52 Mtv Viacom 
United 
States 
Media 6,523 -9 % 
55 53 Volkswagen 
Volkswagen 
Group 
Germany Automotive 6,484 -8 % 
56 59 Xerox Xerox 
United 
States 
Electronics 6,431 1 % 
57 42 
Morgan 
Stanley 
Morgan 
Stanley 
United 
States 
Financial 
Services 
6,399 -26 % 
58 63 Nestlé Nestle Switzerland FMCG 6,319 13 % 
59 60 Chanel 
Family 
Owned 
France Luxury 6,04 -5 % 
60 66 Danone Danone France FMCG 5,96 10 % 
61 64 Kfc Yum! Brands 
United 
States 
Restaurants 5,722 3 % 
62 70 Adidas 
Adidas 
Group 
Germany 
Sporting 
Goods 
5,397 6 % 
63 73 Blackberry Rim Canada Electronics 5,138 7 % 
64 65 Yahoo! Yahoo! 
United 
States 
Internet 
Services 
5,111 -7 % 
65 67 Audi 
Volkswagen 
Group 
Germany Automotive 5,01 -7 % 
66 68 Caterpillar Caterpillar 
United 
States 
Industrial 5,004 -5 % 
67 69 Avon Avon 
United 
States 
FMCG 4,917 -7 % 
68 71 Rolex 
Family 
Owned 
Switzerland Luxury 4,609 -7 % 
69 72 Hyundai Hyundai 
South 
Korea 
Automotive 4,604 -5 % 
70 76 Hermes Hermes France Luxury 4,598 1 % 
71 74 Kleenex 
Kimberly-
Clark 
United 
States 
FMCG 4,404 -5 % 
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72 41 Ubs Ubs Switzerland 
Financial 
Services 
4,37 -50 % 
73 50 
Harley-
Davidson 
Harley-
Davidson 
United 
States 
Automotive 4,337 -43 % 
74 75 Porsche Porsche Germany Automotive 4,234 -8 % 
75 78 Panasonic Panasonic Japan Electronics 4,225 -1 % 
76 80 Tiffany & Co Tiffany & Co 
United 
States 
Luxury 4 -5 % 
77 79 Cartier Richemont France Luxury 3,968 -6 % 
78 77 Gap Gap 
United 
States 
Apparel 3,922 -10 % 
79 81 Pizza Hut Yum! Brands 
United 
States 
Restaurants 3,876 -5 % 
80 92 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
United 
States 
FMCG 3,847 7 % 
81 82 Allianz Allianz Germany 
Financial 
Services 
3,831 -5 % 
82 83 
Moët & 
Chandon 
Lvmh France Alcohol 3,754 -5 % 
83 84 Bp Bp 
United 
Kingdom 
Energy 3,716 -5 % 
84 89 Smirnoff Diageo 
United 
Kingdom 
Alcohol 3,698 3 % 
85 88 Duracell 
Procter & 
Gamble 
United 
States 
Electronics 3,563 -3 % 
86 98 Nivea Beiersdorf Germany FMCG 3,557 5 % 
87 91 Prada Prada Italy Luxury 3,53 -2 % 
88 93 Ferrari 
Scuderia 
Ferrari 
Italy Automotive 3,527 0 % 
89 94 Armani Armani Italy Luxury 3,303 -6 % 
90 85 Starbucks Starbucks 
United 
States 
Restaurants 3,263 -16 % 
91 NEW Lancôme L’Oréal France FMCG 3,235 N/A 
92 97 Shell Shell Netherlands Energy 3,228 -7 % 
93 NEW Burger King Burger King 
United 
States 
Restaurants 3,223 N/A 
94 100 Visa Visa 
United 
States 
Financial 
Services 
3,17 -5 % 
95 NEW Adobe Adobe 
United 
States 
Computer 
Software 
3,161 N/A 
96 90 Lexus Toyota Japan Automotive 3,158 -12 % 
97 NEW Puma Ppr Germany 
Sporting 
Goods 
3,154 N/A 
97 
 
98 NEW Burberry 
Burberry 
Group 
United 
Kingdom 
Luxury 3,095 N/A 
99 NEW 
Polo Ralph 
Lauren 
Polo Ralph 
Lauren 
United 
States 
Luxury 3,094 N/A 
100 NEW Campbell’S 
Campbell 
Soup 
Company 
United 
States 
FMCG 3,081 N/A 
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Table 17: T-test difference in means of monthly returns of "List remainers" and the Global brand 
portfolio 
The Table presents the raw annualized monthly return for the market value-, equal- and brand value-weighted 
“List remainers” and Global portfolios and the t-statistic for the difference in means of these two portfolios. 
T-test difference in means of monthly portfolio returns 
 
"List 
remainers" Global 
T-stat (difference in 
means) 
Market value-
weighted 
 
 
10.70 9.55 0.1326 
Equal-weighted  10.59 10.10 0.0510 
Brand value-
weighted 
 
 
7.52 7.44 0.0084 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% 
level 
 
